The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability by Port, Kenneth L.
Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Mitchell Hamline Open Access
Faculty Scholarship
1993
The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability
Kenneth L. Port
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, ken.port@mitchellhamline.edu
Publication Information
26 Indiana Law Review 519 (1993)
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more
information, please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
Repository Citation
Port, Kenneth L., "The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability" (1993). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 177.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/177
The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability
Abstract
The concept of incontestability in American trademark law has caused great confusion ever since its adoption
as part of United States trademark law in 1946. This Article is first a study of the rational basis for
incontestability in American trademark law. The role of incontestability in the larger regime of American
trademark law is established in order to understand incontestability as it fits within the history of the common
law of trademarks. This is fundamental in order to understand the significance of the thesis that
incontestability is illegitimate. Next, acquisition of incontestability is presented in order to show how simple it
is to attain incontestable status and to put in perspective the resulting advantages. This also demonstrates the
fact that incontestability is a radical departure from the common law of trademarks. This Article concludes
with an analysis of trademarks themselves as property. Because the concept of incontestability was adopted
without reference to the common law, and because it attempts to create property rights in a trademark itself,
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The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability 
KENNETH L. PORT· 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of incontestability in American trademark law has caused 
great confusion ever since its adoption as part of United States trademark 
law in 1946. Commentators as well as courts typically have been uncertain 
about not only what incontestability means, but also its effect in trade-
mark litigation. l Incontestability in American trademark law refers to 
the notion that after five years of use, and the satisfaction of certain 
procedural elements, a trademark registration owner's right to a registered 
mark becomes "incontestable." Incontestability is defined in the Lanham 
Act2 as conclusive evidence of the registration's validity, the mark's 
validity, and the registrant's ownership of the mark.3 
Since 1946, there has been only one United States Supreme Court 
decision that directly addressed and attempted to clarify incontestability: 
Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dol/ar Park & Fly, Inc. 4 The effect of incontestability 
is, in fact, best demonstrated by the Park 'N Fly case. The plaintiff in 
that case owned the federal registration to the service mark PARK 'N 
FLY which it used in connection with long-term parking and shuttle 
services at several major American airports.' The defendant used the 
mark DOLLAR PARK AND FLY on identical services, but only in the 
Portland, Oregon region. 
The owner of the PARK 'N FLY trademark registration sued the 
user of DOLLAR PARK AND FLY for trademark infringement. The 
Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's grant of an injunction protecting 
• Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois 
Institute of Technology; B.A., 1982, Macalester College; J.D., 1989, University of Wis-
consin. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Ronald Staudt and Dale Nance 
for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this Article, to Patrick Flynn for his 
invaluable research and editing assistance, and to Paula Davis Port for her continuing 
support. 
I. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp. of Calif., 694 F.2d 
1150, 1153 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982). See also infra notes 163-76 and accompanying text. 
2. 15 U .S.C. §§ 1051-1072, 1091-1096, 1111-1121, & 1123-1127 (1988) (commonly 
referred to as the Lanham Act). 
3. [d. § 1115(b). 
4. 469 U.S. 189 (1985). 
5. Specifically, St. Louis, Cleveland, Houston, Boston, Memphis, and San Fran-
cisco. Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at- 191. 
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the plaintiff, ruling that its mark was merely descriptive.6 On appeal, 
the Supreme Court reversed and held that the defendant was statutorily 
barred from raising the descriptive nature of the plaintiff's trademark 
because the trademark registration had become "incontestable" pursuant 
to the Lanham Act. 7 If the trademark had not become incontestable, 
the defendant would have been allowed to challenge the validity of the 
mark and probably would have been successful in arguing that the mark 
only described the plaintiff's services and was, therefore, invalid. 8 
This notion of incontestability is jurisprudentially insupportable and 
should be abolished. First, the Lanham Act's primary, express purpose 
was to codify the existing common law of trademarks and not to create 
any new trademark rights. The incontestability provisions of the Lanham 
Act, however, created new rights never before recognized at common 
law. To that extent, the incontestability provisions are contrary to the 
express purpose of the statute and therefore insupportable. 
Incontestability also attempts to make a trademark itself the subject 
of property ownership, another concept that the common law has rejected 
both before and after the passage of the Lanham Act. Trademark rights 
are traditionally defined at common law as the right to use a certain 
mark on certain goods and the right to exclude others from using similar 
marks on similar goods in a way that would be likely to confuse or 
deceive the public.9 This is not the same as saying trademarks themselves 
are property. To the extent incontestability makes (or attempts to make) 
trademarks property, it is completely inconsistent with the common law 
of trademarks. 
Because of this conceptual illegitimacy at its core, incontestability 
is applied in inconsistent, irregular, and sometimes completely contra-
dictory ways by each circuit and even within each circuit. This confusion 
is likely to continue as courts struggle to reconcile and apply both the 
express language of the statute and hundreds of years of trademark 
common law which are, on the subject of incontestability, irreconcilable. 
This Article is first a study of the rational basis for incontestability 
in American trademark law. The role of incontestability in the larger 
regime of American trademark law is established in order to understand 
incontestability as it fits within the history of the common law of 
6. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1983), 
rev'd, 469 u.s. 189 (1985). 
7. 469 U.S. at 205. 
8. See Suman Naresh, Incontestability and Rights in Descriptive Trademarks, 53 
u. CHI. L. REV. 953 (1986), for the proposition that protecting descriptive but incontestable 
marks is ludicrous. 
9. DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW § 5A (1992). 
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trademarks. This is fundamental in order to understand the significance 
of the thesis that incontestability is illegitimate. Next, acquisition of 
incontestability is presented in order to show how simple it is to attain 
incontestable status and to put in perspective the resulting advantages. 
This also demonstrates the fact that incontestability is a radical departure 
from the common law of trademarks. This Article concludes with an 
analysis of trademarks themselves as property. Because the concept of 
incontestability was adopted without reference to the common law, and 
because it attempts to create property rights in a trademark itself, this 
Article concludes that incontestability is jurisprudentially illegitimate and 
should be repealed. 
I. INCONTESTABILITY AND TRADEMARKS UNDER THE LANHAM ACT 
A. Trademark PrimerlO 
Before any meaningful discussion can occur regarding incontesta-
bility, a groundwork must be laid to explain where incontestability fits 
into the more generalized body of law known as trademarks. Trademark 
jurisprudence has developed over centuries of time. During this history, 
there has been nothing even remotely similar to the present day notion 
of incontestability. Therefore, where the legislative history of the Lanham 
Act portrays the Act as a mere registration statute 11 codifying the common 
law of trademarks, it is misleading if not just plain wrong. 
10. See generally LoUIS ALTMAN, CALLMANN UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND 
MONOPOLIES (4th ed. 1981); JEROME Gn.sON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE (1974 
& Cum. SUpp. 1992); John F. Coverdale, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-
on-Competition Test, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 868 (1984). 
II. Any mark is registrable on the Principal Register of the Patent and Trademark 
Office pursuant to the Lanham Act, unless it-
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or 
matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living 
or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, 
or disrepute. 
(b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of 
the United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation, 
or any simulation thereof. 
(c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a 
particular living individual except by his written consent, or the name, signature, 
or portrait of a deceased President of the United States during the life of his 
widow, if any, except by the written consent of the widow. 
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered 
in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used 
in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used 
on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to 
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The use of a mark to identify the source of a product actually 
began at least 3500 years ago when potters made scratchings on the 
bottom of their creations to identify their source. 12 The first judicial 
recognition of trademarks came, however, in 1618 in Southern v. How,l3 
when a Common Pleas Judge in England made an obscure reference to 
a mark used on cloth. There are various renditions of how the subject 
of trademarks arose in Southern v. How, because the reference is actually 
to a prior unreported case which denied trademark rights. 14 The notion 
cause mistake, or to deceive. 
(e) Consists of a mark which, (I) when used on or in connection with the 
goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of 
them, or (2) when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant 
is primarily geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them, 
except as indications of regional origin may be registerable under section 1054 
of this title, or (3) is primarily merely a surname. 
(f) Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs [(a)-(d)] of this section, 
nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the 
applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce. 
The Commissioner may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become 
distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant's goods in commerce, 
proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the 
applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim 
of distinctiveness is made. 
15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988). 
12. See generally WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE-
MARKS 1-14 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 2d ed. 1885); EDWARD S. ROGERS, 
GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 34-39 (1919) [hereinafter GOOD WILL); 
Abraham S. Greenberg, The Ancient Lineage oj Trade-Marks, 33 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK) 
OFF. SOC'Y 876 (1951); Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks-Their Early History, 59 TRADE-
MARK REP. 551 (1969); Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-
Marks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 29 (1910); Gerald Ruston, On the Origin oj Trademarks, 45 
TRADEMARK REP. 127 (1955). Browne traces the use of proprietary marks and trademarks 
back several millennia to China, India, Persia, Egypt, Rome, and Greece, among other 
cultures, as well as citing marks used during the time of the Old Testament. [d. at 8 
(the blocks of stone used to build the temple of Solomon bore quarry marks so the 
"mechanics" could "prov[e] their claims to wages"), and at 10 (Abraham paid for the 
cave in which he buried Sarah with coins bearing a mark of authentication). "Seals and 
other emblems of ownership were coeval with the birth of traffic." [d. at 2. "Such 
emblems had their origin in a general ignorance of reading the combinations of cabalistic 
characters that we call writing." [d. at 3. He discusses proprietary marks such as seals, 
at 4-6, sign-boards, at 6-7, watermarks, at 7-8, quarry and pottery marks, at 8-9, currency, 
at 9-10, identifying marks on merchandise in general, at 10-12, and books, at 12-14. See 
also GILSON, supra note 10, § 1.01(1). 
13. Popham 144, Eng. Rep. 1244, Trinity Term IS, Jac I. 
14. See generally FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 
RELATING TO TRADEMARKS (1925); Kenneth R. Pierce, The Trademark Law Revision Act: 
Origins oj the Use Requirement and an Overview oj the New Federal Trademark Law, 
64 FLA. Bus. J. 35 (May, 1990). 
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of protecting a commercially viable indication of source, therefore, had 
a rather dubious beginning, IS but it soon became a well accepted judicial 
notion in England that a mark deserved protection at common law to 
indicate the source or origin of goods. 16 
The American concept of trademark law followed this English com-
mon law concept of trademarks. I? The notion of trademark protection 
quickly caught on in courts within the United States. IS .It was not until 
1871, however, that the United States Supreme Court decided a trademark 
case. 19 Since 1930, the Supreme Court has decided only five trademark 
cases where infringement or validity was directly at issue. 2o This disinterest 
15. See also Blanchard v. Hill, 2 Atkyns 484 (1742) (court refused to grant injunction 
against alleged infringer because such an injunction would have given the plaintiff a 
monopoly in sales of the relevant product, playing cards); Pierce, supra note 14. 
16. In Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & C. 541 (1824), the court regarded trademark protection 
as well established and awarded an injunction to the plaintiff where the defendant had 
used the plaintiff's mark, SYKES PATENT, on inferior shot-belts and powder-flasks and 
passed them off as products of the plaintiff. Another case still relied upon today is 
Millington v. Fox, 3 Myl. & Cr. 338 (1838), where plaintiff sued in equity to enjoin use 
of his mark. The court, in awarding the injunction, stated that the plaintiff had a right 
to enforce title to its mark and that an injunction was appropriate even though there 
was no direct proof of defendant's intent to defraud and that the defendant may not 
have even known of the plaintiff's mark. The United States Supreme Court has adopted 
this case as controlling. See Saxlehner v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 179 U.S. 42 (1900). See also 
GILSON, supra note 10, § 1.01[1). 
17. United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) [hereinafter Trade-Mark 
Cases); Patricia Kimball Fletcher, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic 
Value of a Trademark System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 297, 301-02 (1982); Pierce, supra 
note 14, at 36 (English common law adopted trademarks from regulations by medieval 
guilds designed to protect the public against deception). 
18. GILSON, supra note 10, at § 1.01[2). By 1870, there were 62 trademark cases 
decided in the United States, although 40 of them were in New York state courts. See 
ROOERS, GOOD WILL, supra note 12, at 48-49 for a breakdown of these cases by year. 
Rogers also stated that "[i)t has only been since about 1890 that the cases began to be 
at all numerous." [d. at 49. He suggested mass marketing may have been the cause for 
the surge in litigation. [d. 
19. Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311 (1871) (holding that miners did not have 
exclusive rights to use LACKAWANNA COAL as the geographic descriptive source of 
their coal; newcomers could freely use LACKAWANNA COAL as long as it was true; 
LACKAWANNA COAL was no "peculiar property" of the plaintiff). 
20. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992) (protecting as 
trade dress the interior of a Mexican restaurant); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. 
United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (finding the United States Olympic 
Committee had an exclusive right to use the mark OLYMPIC); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. 
Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985) (interpreting incontestability); Inwood Lab., 
Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982) (finding third party infringement); Armstrong 
Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938) (finding, inter alia, 
infringement of plaintiff's mark, NU-ENAMEL; interpreting the Trade-Mark Act of 1920 
in light of the 1905 Act). Several other cases involved trademarks but did not directly 
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by the Supreme Court is totally unjustified in light of the heavy case 
load of the circuit courts in adjudicating trademark cases. 21 
The first United States trademark legislation was proposed in 1791 
by Thomas Jefferson.22 Jefferson correctly saw that any such legislation 
must be grounded in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 23 Jef-
ferson perceived that exclusive rights to use a trademark had potentially 
significant economic effects, that a trademark registration system would 
be useful in streamlining and equalizing access to those rights, "and 
confront infringement or validity. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) 
(Kennedy, J.), and 485 U.S. 176 (1988) (Brennan, J.) (each opinion reaching a different 
conclusion concerning gray market goods and importation rights); Fleischmann Distilling 
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967) (holding attorney's fees are not available 
under the Lanham Act); Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Horne's Market, Inc., 385 
U.S. 23 (1966) (holding that a denial of a motion for summary judgement, the motion 
seeking a permanent injunction and damages in a trademark infringement suit, related 
only to pretrial procedures, and not the merits, and therefore was not "interlocutory" 
and accordingly not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(I»; Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 
369 U.S. 469 (1962) (finding that the plaintiff in a trademark infringement and breach 
of contract action is entitled to a jury trial, due to the legal nature of one of several 
requested remedies); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 
U.S. 203 (1942) (granting the victorious plaintiff profits and damages under the 1905 Act, 
despite the lack of direct economic competition; expressly declined to decide the merits 
of the infringement issue); Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 
(1942) (per curiam) (finding local law applies to a mark not registered under the Trade-
Mark Act of 1905, but instead registered under the copyright law, apparently by mistake); 
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81 (1941) (holding the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation liable in a series of failed trademark infringement 
suits for costs and any additional allowance made by the court in equity). In the last 
decade, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to three trademark cases, all with a 
dissent by Justice White and involving whether a district court's likelihood of confusion 
finding is reviewable under the "clearly erroneous" standard as a finding of fact, or 
under the de novo standard as a conclusion of law. Novak v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. 
Co., 488 U.S. 933 (1988) (cert. denied) (White, J., dissenting); Euroquilt, Inc. v. Scandia 
Down Corp., 475 U.S. 1147 (1986) (cert. denied) (White, J., dissenting); Elby's Big Boy 
of Steubenville, Inc. v. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc., 459 U.S. 916 (1982) (cert. denied) 
(White, J., dissenting). 
21. See, e.g., GILSON, supra note 10, § 1.01[2]. There were over 2,000 substantive 
trademark cases decided by the circuit and appellate courts in this same time period. 
Search of LEXIS, TRDMRK Library, FEDCTS File (October I, 1992). 
22. GOOD WILL, supra note 12, at 47-48; Beverly W. Pattishall, The Constitutional 
Foundations oj American Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 456, 459 (1988) (citing 
to Am. State Papers 48). See also Pierce, supra note 14, at 37. 
23. GOOD WILL, supra note 12, at 48, and Pattishall, supra note 22, at 459 (Jefferson 
limited any trademark law to "commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian tribes," tracking the Commerce Clause verbatim). As will be 
seen later, Jefferson was way ahead of his time. It took the United States Congress about 
110 years before it enacted a trademark protection statute grounded in the Commerce 
Clause. 
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that trademark infringers should be punished."24 Although the 2nd Con-
gress of the United States defeated Jefferson's proposed trademark law,25 
Jefferson's insights on the subject proved instrumental in the 1946 Act. 
The first enacted federal trademark statute in the United States was 
the Act of 1870.26 This statute was enacted primarily to implement 
treaties agreed upon several years earlier. 27 That is, it was international 
demand, not domestic demand, that led to the first trademark statute. 
In 1868, the United States ratified a treaty with Russia. 28 In 1869, 
the United States ratified a treaty with Belgium29 and a convention with 
France.3o Each of these granted reciprocal rights in trademarks for citizens 
of each country. Pursuant to each of these agreements, in order for a 
Russian, Belgian, or French citizen to obtain trademark rights in the 
United States, such a person had to file a trademark registration with 
the United States government.31 At the time, however, there was no 
federal trademark registration system and, therefore, it was actually 
impossible for anyone to take advantage of the new treaties. Conse-
quently, there was much pressure on Congress to push forward the Act 
of 1870. 
24. GILSON, supra note 10, § 1.01(2); Pierce, supra note 14, at 37 (quoting Jefferson 
as insisting that trademark protection would "contribute to fidelity in the execution of 
manufacturing" and pushing Congress to pass legislation that would "[permit) the owner 
of every manufactory to enter in the record of the court of the district wherein his 
manufactory is, the name with which he chooses to mark or designate his wares, and 
rendering it penal to others to put the same mark on any other wares."). 
25. Pattishall, supra note 22, at 460; ROGERS, GOOD WILL, supra note 12, at 48 
("It is evident that there was not a sufficient demand at the time of Jefferson's report 
or for seventy-nine years afterwards for a law to put into effect his recommendations 
and it was not until 1905 that they were fully carried out. "). New York was the first 
state to enact a trademark law ostensibly to prevent fraud in the use of false stamps and 
labels, but did not do so until 1845. [d. 
26. Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 Stat. 198. 
27. BROWNE, supra note 12, at 292. In fact, in the Trade-Mark Cases, the Attorney 
General for the United States argued that "[t)he purpose and the natural and reasonable 
effect of the acts are to protect the producer or the importer of foreign goods in his 
right of seIling them in the United States, and thus carry out in good faith and enforce 
our treaty stipulations on the subject. The act is a regulation of foreign commerce." 
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 88 (1879). 
28. Additional Article to the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, January 27, 
1868, U.S.-Russ., 16 Stat. 389. 
29. Additional Article to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, July 30, 1869, 
U.S.-Belg., 16 Stat. 359. 
30. Convention Concerning Trade Marks, April 16, 1869, U.S.-Fr., 16 Stat. 365. 
31. For a discussion on the procedure foreign citizens were required to follow 
under the Trade Mark Act of 1881, the constitutional amended version of the Act of 
1870, see BROWNE, supra note 12, at 293-94. 
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Perhaps because of Congress' continental perspective over the treaties 
at issue,32 the Act of 1870 codified existing common law principles and 
created trademark rights based more on continental notions of trademark 
law than common law. 33 Most notably, the Act of 1870 allowed reg-
istration by any person who was entitled to the exclusive use of any 
lawful trademark or who intended to adopt and use any trademark for 
use within the United States. 34 
The Act of 1870 was soon struck down by the Supreme Court as 
unconstitutional. In the Trade-Mark Cases,3S the Supreme Court con-
firmed that trademarks had always been protected by the common law. 36 
To grant new substantive rights in trademark law, Congress would have 
to point to a specific provision of the Constitution upon which it based 
32. See BROWNE, supra note 12, concluding that "[t)he Act of 1870 afforded the 
means whereby American citizens might furnish evidence required in other countries, and 
foreigners might also avail themselves of protection guaranteed by treaties, conventions, 
&c. To this extent at least, it was an act to carry out the treaty stipulations .... " Id. 
at 292. Browne also determined that "[a)mong commercial nations, there is a growing 
tendency to a general recognition of the emblems of commerce known as trade-marks; 
for such recognition operates as a safeguard against fraud on their own communities. 
Hence ... the liberal views entertained by the judicial courts of nearly all the enlightened 
countries." Id. at 297. 
33. For a comparison of trademark law in common law countries and civil law 
countries at the time qf the Lanham Act, see J.R. Wilson, Trade-Marks and Laws in 
Foreign Countries, 37 T~EMARK REP. 107 (1947). The primary difference for purposes 
here of the two systems is that common law countries such as the United States and 
Britain base trademark rights on use rather than registration. Id. at 109. Civil law countries, 
including many in continental Europe and Latin America, confer trademark rights upon 
registration, without regard to immediate use. Id. at 113. See also Robert A. Christensen, 
Trademark Incontestability-Time for the Next Step, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1196, 1197 n.12 
(1966), for the view that "[t)he impact of incontestability on litigation ... controls the 
degree to which the American trademark system is registration- rather than use-oriented. 
Because some, but not all, of the defenses available to the infringer in a wholly use-
oriented system are precluded and because the owner must wait five years for the protection 
conferred by registration, our present trademark system lies somewhere between the two 
possible extremes." For a discussion on the difference between civil law and common law 
systems generally, see R.H. Helmholz, Continental Law and Common Law: Historical 
Strangers or Companions?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1207 (1990); Walter F. Murphy, The 19th 
John M. Tucker, Jr. Lecture in Civil Law: Civil Law, Common Law, and Constitutional 
Democracy, 52 LA. L. REV. 91 (1991); Roscoe Pound, A Comparison of Systems of Law, 
10 U. PIlT. L. REV. 271 (1948). 
34. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 77, 16 Stat. 198. 
35. 100 U.S. 82 (1879). Another comment on the international aspect of the Act 
is the fact that two of the three cases heard together under the name "Trade-Mark Cases" 
involved American merchants charged with infringing French trademarks. Id. at 82-83. 
Both Steffens and Wittemann were charged with infringing the trademarks of French 
champagne producers, G.H. Mumm & Co. and Kunkleman & Co., respectively. 
36. Id. at 92. 
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this authority.37 Since the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution38 
did not expressly include protection of trademarks, such authority would 
have to be found elsewhere. Trademarks, the court reasoned, do not 
"depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. 
It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. 
[Trademarks are] simply founded on priority of appropriation. "39 
The next significant attempt at a federal trademark registration system 
came with the Act of 1905.40 The Act of 1905, however, was not well 
conceived. Commentators have described the Act of 1905 as "a slovenly 
piece of legislation, characterized by awkward phraseology, bad grammar 
and involved sentences. Its draftsmen had a talent for obscurity amount-
ing to genius. "41 
Interpretations of the Act of 1905 were influenced heavily by the 
Trade-Mark Cases. Subsequent cases generally concluded that Congress 
had no authority to regulate substantive trademark law, so the Act of 
1905 entitled registration only of those trademark rights already rec-
ognized at common law.42 This, of course, totally defeated the purpose 
37. Id. at 93. 
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
39. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94. The Act of 1870 also contained an intent-
to-use provision. The constitutional legitimacy of the intent-to-use portion of the Act was 
not clearly determined; the Supreme Court found the Act unconstitutional because it was 
not based on the Commerce Clause. In 1988, Congress amended the Lanham Act to 
include an intent-to-use provision where trademark holders could register their marks for 
three years if they had a bona fide intention to use the marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). 
Because use of the mark is not required and, therefore, there is no actual interstate 
commerce, the intent-to-use provisions should fail constitutional review based on the 
commerce clause as in the Trade-Mark Cases. However, several commentators have argued 
that the current intent-to-use provisions are constitutional because they are part of the 
"flow of commerce" notion and the Supreme Court shows great deference toward con-
gressional power with regard to Commerce Clause issues. See Charles James Vinicombe, 
The Constitutionality 0/ an Intent to Use Amendment to the Lanham Act, 78 TRADEMARK 
REP. 361, 369-73 (1988). See generally Frank Hellwig, The Trademark Law Revision Act 
0/ 1988: The IOOth Congress Leaves Its Mark, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 287 (1989). 
40. Act of February 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724. This Act allowed registration 
of marks used in interstate commerce for a period of 20 years with an unlimited right 
of renewal. Registration constituted prima facie evidence of ownership of the mark, accorded 
the owner federal jurisdiction, and provided certain remedies for infringement. 
41. Edward S. Rogers, The Expensive Futility 0/ the United States Trade-Mark 
Statute, 12 MICH. L. REv. 660, 665 (1914). 
42. See, e.g., American Trading Co. v. H.E. Heacock Co., 285 U.S. 247 (1932) 
(court gives priority over subsequent trademark registration in the Philippines because 
Congress has express authority to create trademark rights there and not in the United 
States); American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372 (1926); United Drug Co. 
v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 99 (1918) ("registration of the [petitioner's) 
trade-mark under ... the act of Congress [did not have) the effect of enlarging the rights 
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of national legislation: to create one unified system of registration and 
enforcement of trademark rights. 
After various amendments to the Act of 1905 failed to cure its illS,43 
the entire Act was thrown out in favor of a new statute crafted and 
pushed to passage largely by Representative Fritz G. Lanham. The 
Lanham Act was first introduced in 1938 but was not actually passed 
until 1946 and did not become effective until 1947. 
Today, under the Lanham Act, trademarks are defined as any "word, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ... used ... to 
indicate the source of the goods .... "44 Trademarks are generally cat-
egorized into one of four groups: generic, descriptive, suggestive, and 
arbitrary or fanciful. 4S The strongest mark is an arbitrary or fanciful 
of [petitioner) beyond what they would be under common-law principles."). But, c.!, 
Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1943) (Congress had the 
authority to create substantive trademark rights and did so in the Act of 1905). 
43. In 1946, the Act of 1905 had forty-one sections. Of those, a total of 24 sections 
had been modified or added since the Act was passed. A review of the final, 1946 version 
shows these amendments were: 
Act of May 4, 1906, ch. 2081, §§ I, 2, 3, 34 Stat. 168. 
Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2573, §§ I, 2, 2(b), 34 Stat. 1251. 
Act of Feb. 18, 1909, ch. 144, 35 Stat. 627. 
Act of Feb. 18, 1911, ch. 113, 36 Stat. 918. 
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 291, 36 Stat. 1167 (circuit court jurisdiction generally). 
Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 370, § 5, 37 Stat. 498. 
Act of Jan. 8, 1913, ch. 7, 37 Stat. 649. 
Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, §§ 1-9, 41 Stat. 535 (implementing the Buenos Aires 
convention of Aug. 20, 1910, among other purposes). 
Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 341, 43 Stat. 647. 
Act of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 535, §§ I, 3, 43 Stat. 1268. 
Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475 (granting jurisdiction to the Circuit 
Court of Patent Appeals). 
Act of April II, 1930, ch. 132, § 4, 46 Stat. 155. 
Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 426, 48 Stat. 926 (concerning the jurisdiction of the D.C. 
Circuit Court). 
Act of June 20, 1936, ch. 617, 49 Stat. 1539. 
Act of June 25, 1936, ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921 (concerning the jurisdiction of the D.C. 
Circuit Court). 
Act of June 10, 1938, ch. 332, 52 Stat. 638 (providing for the protection of collective 
marks). 
See Beverly W. Pattishall, The Lanham Trademark Act-Its Impact Over Four Decades, 
76 TRADEMARK REP. 193, 195, n.16 (1986). 
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). See Towers v. Advent Software, Inc., 913 F.2d 942, 
945 (Fed. CiT. 1990); Hughes v. Design Look, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988). 
45. See generally Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 
9-11 (2d CiT. 1976). 
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one46 such as KODAK47 or EXXON.48 The weakest mark is a generic 
mark49 such as CELLOPHANEsO or ASPIRIN.sl All marks are said to 
fit somewhere on this continuum,s2 although some courts have recognized 
the fact that there are no clear lines separating these categories.S3 The 
assignment of a specific trademark to these categories is not necessarily 
static. A mark can conceivably move from one category to another 
based on how the mark is used by the owner and the degree of consumer 
recognition developed in the mark. 
Generic marks are words that refer to the specific genus of which 
the particular product is aspecies.s4 In other words, generic marks are 
terms for which there is no other descriptive word in the English language. 
A mark is said to become generic when it ceases to denote source and 
starts denoting the product itself. ss Famous examples of marks that have 
46. Clipper Cruise Line, Inc. v. Star Clippers, Inc., 952 F.2d 1046 (8th Cir. 1992); 
Cellular Sales, Inc. v. MacKay, 942 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1991); General Mills, Inc. v. 
Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1987). 
47. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Weil, 243 N.Y.S. 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930). 
48. Exxon Corp. v. Xoil Energy Resources, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 1008, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
49. Dranoff-Perlstein Assoc. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 855 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding 
"if we hold a designation generic, it is never protectable") (In fact, a generic mark would 
not have trademark status at all); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 
684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 
F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). 
50. DuPont Cellophane Co., Inc. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936). 
51. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. Supp. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
52. Perini Corp. v. Perini Construction, Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976»; 
Induct-O-Matic Corp. v. Inductotherm Corp., 747 F.2d 358, 362 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing 
Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977), cerro 
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978». 
53. Union Nat'l Bank of Texas, Laredo v. Union Nat'l Bank of Texas, Austin, 
909 F.2d 839, 846 (5th Cir. 1990) (" 'Although meant as pigeon-holes, these useful labels 
are instead central tones in a spectrum; they tend to merge at their edges and are frequently 
difficult to apply.' " (quoting Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th 
Cir. 1980))); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 
1977) ("As the ease with which hues in the solar spectrum may be classified on the basis 
of perception will depend upon where they fall in that spectrum, so it is with a term on 
the trademark spectrum"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978»; See also In re Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Blinded 
Veterans Ass'n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
54. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); Clipper 
Cruise Line, Inc. v. Star Clippers, Inc., 952 F.2d 1046, 1047 (8th Cir. 1992); Union Nat'l 
Bank, Laredo, 909 F.2d at 845 ("A generic term is one which identifies a genus or class 
of things or services, of which the particular item in question is merely a member."); 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
55. Miller Brewing Co., 561 F.2d at 75. 
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been held to be generic include LITE for use on beer,56 and SHREDDED 
WHEAT for use on cereal. 57 Generic marks are not registrable. 58 Marks 
that become generic may be canceled at any time.59 The test for deter-
mining if a trademark has become generic is whether the primary sig-
nificance of the mark identifies the producer60 or the product. 61 To the 
extent that the primary significance of the mark is to identify the product, 
the mark has become generic. 
The rationale for preventing trademark protection for generic marks 
is simple: allowing a monopoly on the use of a commonly used term 
would be ludicrous. No individual should be able to appropriate existing 
terms in the language for their own commercial advantage when to do 
so would prevent competitors from using that term to describe their 
competing products. 62 When a trademark stops denoting the source of 
56. Id. 
57. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. III (1938). 
58. For example, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held the mark ICE-PAK 
to be generic and therefore unregistrable. In re Stanbel, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1469, 1472 
(T.T.A.B. 1990). See also Clipper Cruise Line, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1048 (finding the term 
CLIPPER generic as applied to cruise ships). 
59. Park' N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064(3), 1065(4) (1992 Supp.). Although it is fairly common 
for marks to evolve from distinctive to generic through improper usage by the owner or 
genericide by competitors, some trademarks have moved from generic to distinctive. In 
1896, the Supreme Court held that the trademark SINGER had become the generic name 
for a sewing machine. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896). Singer 
continued to use their mark and a half century later re-established it as a distinctive mark. 
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1953). 
60. The customer need not know what producer, just that it came from a single 
source. Roulo v. Russ Berrig & Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1989); Processed 
Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1982). 
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988); Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 118. 
62. See Bernard v. Commerce Drug Co., 964 F.2d 1338, 1342 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(although finding the plaintiff's mark ARTHRITICARE merely descriptive, the court stated 
"[o)ur conclusion is bolstered by the concern that 'exclusive use of the term might unfairly 
"monopolize" common speech.' ... According trademark protection to ARTHRITlCARE 
could preclude forever manufacturers of products marketed to arthritis sufferers from 
using the root of the word 'arthritic' for their products.") See also United Drug Co. v. 
Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("The owner of a trade-mark may not, 
like the proprietor of a patented invention, make a negative and merely prohibitive use 
of it as a monopoly."); Dranoff-Perlstein Assoc. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 857 (3d Cir. 
1992) ("Generic terms are denied trademark protection because granting one firm their 
exclusive use would place competitors at a serious competitive disadvantage.' ') (citing I 
GILSON, supra note 10, § 2.02, at 2-23); Hutchinson v. Essence Communications, Inc., 
769 F. Supp. 541, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (remarking that "a trademark owner is not entitled 
to ... pursue a course of action which, if successful, 'would be tantamount to awarding 
it exclusive dominion over a word in common usage,' with the consequent 'right to impair 
other parties' possible entrance into areas of endeavor far removed from its own.' "). 
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a good and instead identifies the good itself, it becomes the victim of 
genericide and ceases to function as a trademark.63 
For our purposes here, descriptive marks are most interesting, because 
it is with descriptive marks that incontestability has the largest impact. 
Descriptive marks are those marks that only describe the good or service 
on which they are used,64 or an attribute of that good or service.6s In 
order to be registrable and enforceable, the owner of a descriptive 
trademark must show that the mark possesses secondary meaning.66 If 
a descriptive mark lacks secondary meaning, it is said to be "merely 
descriptive" and, therefore, not registrable and not enforceable. 67 
Secondary meaning is the notion that if a word is used long enough 
and enough money is spent promoting the mark, the consuming public 
will, at some point, come to associate the word with the product68 and, 
thereby, the word will attain trademark status. The "secondary" meaning 
attained by a word is that it functions not only as a word but also as 
a trademark-that is, a source indicating significance.69 
63. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1321-
26 (9th Cir. 1982); Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 80-
81 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). 
64. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 992 (7th 
Cir. 1989); Wynn Oil Co. & Classic Car Wash, Inc. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1190 
(6th Cir. 1988). 
65. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); 
Bernard, 964 F .2d at 1341 ("a mark can be classified as descriptive if it conveys 'an 
immediate idea of some characteristic or attribute of the product,' " (quoting Papercutter, 
Inc. v. Fay's Drug Co., 900 F.2d 558, 562 (2d Cir. 1990))); Union Nat'l Bank, Laredo 
v. Union Nat'l Bank of Texas, Austin, 909 F.2d 839, 845 (5th CiT. 1990) ("A descriptive 
term is one that 'identifies a characteristic or quality of the article or service, "') (quoting 
Vision Center v. Opticks, 596 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 
(1980». 
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1988); Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194; Coach House 
Restaurant, Inc. v. Coach and Six Restaurants, Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991); 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 182, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
67. Papercutter, Inc. v. Fay's Drug Co., Inc., 900 F.2d 558, 562 (2d Cir. 1990); 
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, 873 F.2d at 992; Blisscraft of Hollywood 
v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 698 (1961) ("[W)ords which are merely descriptive 
of the qualities, ingredients or composition of an article cannot be appropriated as a 
trademark and are not entitled to protection unless they have acquired secondary meaning"). 
68. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) 
("The basic element of secondary meaning is, thus, the mental association by a substantial 
segment of consumers and potential consumers 'between the alleged mark and a single 
source of the product,''') (quoting McCarthy, §§ 15:2 at 659, and 15:11(B) at 686); 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1974). 
69. Dranoff-Perlstein Assoc. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 858 (3d Cir. 1992) ("In order 
for secondary meaning to exist, 'it is not necessary for the public to be aware of the 
name of the [source) .... It is sufficient if the public is aware that the product [or 
HeinOnline -- 26 Ind. L. Rev. 532 1992-1993
532 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:519 
Suggestive trademarks are those marks which, although not arbitrary 
or fanciful, require some amount of imagination to determine what the 
association is between the trademark and the goods or services. 70 Sug-
gestive marks, therefore, do not require a showing of secondary meaning 
to be validly registered and enforceable.71 Examples of suggestive marks 
include COPPERTONE for suntan lotion72 and HEARTWISE for use 
on vegetable protein meat substitute foods. 73 
Arbitrary74 or fancifup5 marks are those that have no mark/product 
association whatsoever at conception.76 These marks are often referred 
to as "inherently distinctive" at least partially because they do not 
require secondary meaning in order to be registered or enforced.77 
Only trademarks that are inherently distinctive or registrations that 
have become incontestable need not specifically be shown to have sec-
service] comes from a single, though anonymous, source.''') (quoting Union Carbide 
Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir. 1976»; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 
v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 182, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) ("A mark has acquired 
secondary meaning when it 'has been used so long and so exclusively by one producer 
with reference to its article that, in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, 
the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was the first producer's trademark. "') 
(quoting G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1467 
(E.D. Wis. 1987), afl'd, 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989». 
70. Union Nat'l Bank of Texas, Laredo, Texas v. Union Nat'l Bank of Texas, 
Austin, Texas, 909 F.2d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 1990); Forum Corp. of N.A. v. Forum, Ltd., 
903 F.2d 434, 443 (7th Cir. 1990); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 1121 (2d ed. 1984). 
71. MCCARTHY, supra note 70, § 1120; Papercutter, Inc. v. Fay's Drug Co., 900 
F.2d 558, 562 (2d Cir. 1990); G. Heileman Brewing Co. Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 
873 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1989). A precise discussion of suggestiveness is beyond the 
scope of this Article. The difference between descriptive and suggestive marks is often 
thought of as arbitrary. See, e.g., Anthony L. Fletcher & David J. Kera, The Forty-Third 
Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 
591, 670 (1990). 
72. Douglas Lab., Inc. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1954). 
73. Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. SUpp. 1417 (S.D. Ohio 1990). 
74. A mark is said to be arbitrary when it consists of a common word applied 
in an unfamiliar way. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, II 
n.12 (2d Cir. 1976). 
75. Fanciful marks are those "invented ~olely for their use as trademarks." Id. 
at II. 
76. Coach House Restaurant, Inc. v. Coach & Six Restaurants, Inc., 934 F.2d 
1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1991); Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 975, 982 
(2d Cir. 1988). 
77. Coach House Restaurant, Inc., 934 F.2d 1551 at 1559; Investacorp, Inc. v. 
Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519,1522 (11th Cir. 1991); Blisscraft of Hollywood 
v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1961) ("The presumption that a fanciful 
word or mark becomes distinctive and identifies the source of goods on which it is used 
immediately after adoption and bona fide first use is basic in trademark law.") (citing 
HARRY D. NIMS, 2 UNFAIR COMPETITION & TRADEMARKS § 346 at 1078 (4th ed. 1947». 
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ondary meaning in order to avoid being non-suited in a federal trademark 
infringement action. Trademarks that fall within the suggestive or ar-
bitrary or fanciful categories are inherently distinctive and, therefore, 
need not be shown to possess secondary meaning.78 The plaintiff, how-
ever, must show that a descriptive mark possesses secondary meaning 
or be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 79 
Establishing secondary meaning is not an easy task for a trademark 
holder of a descriptive mark. It requires a certain degree of proof to 
show that a descriptive term has secondary meaning.80 Therefore, if a 
plaintiff is not required to show that its mark has secondary meaning-
that is, is granted statutory conclusive presumption of secondary meaning-
the plaintiff gains a significant substantive advantage over an infringing 
third party. Likewise, if a plaintiff must show that its mark has attained 
secondary meaning because the plaintiff's mark is weak, an infringing 
defendant has a much better chance of success on the merits. 
As will be developed below, this is precisely the role of incontest-
ability. A weak but incontestable registration is still valid and may be 
enforced in some circuits under a statutory grant of validity, even though 
the mark is weak, and because of this lack of actual secondary meaning 
may be otherwise invalid. 
B. Reasons for the Secondary Meaning Requirement 
The requirement that an otherwise descriptive mark have secondary 
meaning before it is enforceable or registerabie is justified as a facilitation 
on competition among producers.8! If even descriptive, and therefore 
the weakest trademarks were granted protection from the point of in-
78. See generally CmsUM & JACOBS, supra note 9, at § 5C[3)[a). 
79. General Time Instruments Corp. v. United States Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853, 
854-55 (2d Cir. 1948); Black & Decker, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 632 F. Supp. 
185, 194 (D. Conn. 1986); American Luggage Works, Inc. v. United States Trunk Co., 
Inc., 158 F. Supp. 50, 51 (D. Mass. 1957). 
80. Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 1016 (1980). See also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 786 F. 
Supp. 182, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that although the mark EXCEDRIN PM had 
attained secondary meaning, the combination "PM" standing on its own had not; "Bristol-
Myers ha[d) failed to meet the 'heavy burden' of showing that the efforts undertaken to 
associate the 'PM' indicator with one source have been effective.") (citing 20th Century 
Wear v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 815 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1987». 
81. Industria Arredamenti Fratelli v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 
1984); Daniel J. Gifford, The Interplay of Product Definition, Design and Trade Dress, 
75 MINN. L. REV. 769 (1991). 
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ception, it would amount to an obstacle to competition.82 The holder 
of one mark could block the entrance into a specific market by other 
competitors by merely claiming trademark rights to a descriptive feature 
of the product.83 
An owner of a weak mark should not be able to protect or enforce 
that mark against others because that owner's rights have not become 
clarified. Trademark rights to weak or descriptive marks become clarified 
by the consumers themselves when they come to associate a trademark 
with a producer of those goods. Unless the mark has secondary meaning, 
the mark is merely a word that other market participants presumably 
would need in order to describe adequately their products. Allowing 
trademark rights in a descriptive mark without secondary meaning would 
be essentially granting a monopoly on a word or words that competitors 
need to describe their goods.84 
This is essentially the impact of incontestable trademark registra-
tions-automatic secondary meaning without a specific evidentiary show-
ing. This device is an extremely powerful weapon in trademark Iitigation. 8s 
C. Incontestability Under the Lanham Act 
Before analyzing the theoretical grounding of incontestability, it is 
important first to develop how incontestability functions. 
82. Attempting to enforce a descriptive mark and thereby attempting to monopolize 
a market could arguably violate the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988), the Clayton 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988) and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
41-45 (1988). See also CPG Prods. Corp. v. Pegasus Luggage, Inc., 776 F.2d 1007, 1016 
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich, J., dissenting): 
the underlying principle involved in antitrust law: competition in the marketplace 
is to be encouraged and to that end copying-even outright, deliberate copying-
is permitted as beneficial to consumers except where it is forbidden by patent 
law or deemed 'unfair' because it involves explicit or inherent falsification of 
some kind. 
83. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. ·1985) 
(there are a limited number of terms available to competitors to describe their products 
and a single party should not be allowed to "snatch for themselves the riches of the 
language and make it more difficult for new entrants to identify their own products"); 
; 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1984) (terms 
should not be monopolized by a single use), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); In re 
DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1044 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (descriptive terms should remain 
unencumbered for use by all to associate such symbols with their goods). 
84. See generally William F. Gaske, Trade Dress Protection: Inherent Distinctiveness 
as an Alternative to Secondary Meaning, 57 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 1123 (1989); Justin 
Huges, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Timothy R.M. 
Bryant, Trademark Infringement: The Irrelevance of Evidence of Copying to Secondary 
Meaning, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 473 (1989). 
85. Anthony L. Fletcher, Incontestability and Constructive Notice: A Quarter Cen-
tury of Adjudication, 63 TRADEMARK REP. 71, 94 (1973). 
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1. Acquisition oj Incontestable Status.-Currently, under the Lan-
ham Act, a registration becomes "incontestable" after five years of 
continuous use and satisfaction of certain formalistic procedures.86 Once 
a trademark registration becomes incontestable, the validity of the mark, 
the validity of the owner's ownership of the mark, and the owner's 
exclusive right to use the mark on designated goods may be challenged 
only on eight enumerated grounds. 87 
Acquisition of incontestable status is an amazingly simple procedure 
in light of the profound advantages the registrant receives. Merely by 
filing what is known as a Section 15 Affidavit88 stating the mark has 
been in use for five consecutive years, and compliance with other minimal 
requirements,89 a registration becomes incontestable. 90 There is no sub-
stantive review procedure by the Patent and Trademark Office, and no 
other proof of such five-year use is required. 91 
Once a Section 15 Affidavit is filed and accepted by the Patent and 
Trademark Office, the mark is considered incontestable and the owner 
can take advantage of section 33(b) of the Lanham Act. Although the 
term "incontestable" has been criticized as being misleading given the 
86. 15 U .S.C. § 1065 (1988). Although there is some literature to the contrary, § 
1065 provides that the right to use a mark in commerce on goods for which it was 
registered becomes incontestable. See, e.g., Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 
F.2d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 1982) for the proposition that the trademark becomes incontestable. 
It is not the mark that becomes incontestable but, rather, the right to use the mark. This 
distinction becomes significant later in this Article when "trademark" is distinguished 
from "property." 
87. 15 U .S.C. § 1115 (1988). 
88. Id. § 1065; 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.167-168. See also GILSON, supra note 10, § 4.03(2)[bJ. 
89. The § 15 Affidavit must be signed by the registrant, identify the registration 
number and date of the trademark, recite the goods or services stated in the registration 
or if they are different the goods identified in the registration on which the mark has 
been used for five years, specify that there has been no adverse action to the registrant's 
claims of ownership, specify that there is no proceeding pending involving the registrant's 
ownership rights, be filed within one year of the expiration of any five-year period of 
continuous use, and include the appropriate fee ($100.00). 37 C.F.R. § 2.167. 
90. The Patent and Trademark Office does not examine the merits of affidavits 
under § 15. Affidavits are processed and placed in the file without regard to their sufficiency. 
The Patent and Trademark Office merely notifies the registrant that the affidavit was 
"accepted" and that the file is stamped "Sec. 15 Affidavit Received." Affidavits are 
inspected, however, and if the error is substantial the registrant is notified. The Patent 
and Trademark Office has no requirement that the error be corrected because compliance 
with § 15 is completely voluntary. A registrant may choose not to take advantage of 
incontestability. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK 
MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1604 (1986). 
91. See Chauncey P. Carter, Trade-Mark "Incontestability", 36 TRADEMARK REP. 
185, 186 (1946) (not the duty of the Commissioner to examine each mark as it comes 
up for registration but rather is left open for challenge in civil actions, cancellation 
proceedings, or other proceedings by affected parties). 
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numerous exceptions stated in section 33(b),92 incontestable status provides 
powerful evidentiary advantages in trademark litigation93 because an in-
contestable registration is "conclusive evidence of the validity of the 
registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's 
ownership of the mark, and the registrant's exclusive right to use the 
registered mark in commerce."94 In other words, an incontestable reg-
istration is conclusive evidence of the registrant's interests in and to the 
mark. 
The actual application of the concept of incontestability involves the 
simultaneous application of three sections of the Lanham Act-sections 
14, 15, and 33.9~ Section 14 addresses when and how marks can be 
canceled.96 First, section 14 lists five instances when a petition to cancel 
a registration of a mark may be filed by a person who believes that 
they have been or will be damaged by the registration: 
1. Within five years from the date of the registration.97 
2. Within five years of the date of publication under § 1062(c) of 
the Lanham Act of a mark registered under prior trademark 
laws.98 
92. Note, Incontestable Trademark Rights and Equitable Defenses in Infringement 
Litigation, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 158, 158 n.3 (1985); Percy E. Williamson, Jr., Trade-
Marks Registered Under the Lanham Act Are Not "Incontestable," 37 TRADEMARK REP. 
404, 404 (1947). 
93. GILSON, supra note 10, § 4.03(3); Christensen, supra note 33. Christensen states 
that "[incontestability) has a significant impact on litigation. It is the main advantage of 
using trademark registrations in infringement actions, because it denies an alleged infringer 
important defenses." Id. at 1196-97. 
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988). American Express v. American Express Limousine 
Serv., 772 F. Supp. 729,732 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting plaintiff's request for a preliminary 
injunction with regard to defendant's use of plaintiff's incontestable mark AMERICAN 
EXPRESS). 
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064, 1065, and 1115 (1988), respectively. Texas Pig Stands v. 
Hard Rock Cafe Int'I, 951 F.2d 684, 693, 689, 690 (5th CiT. 1992). 
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988); Treadwell's Drifters Inc. v. Marshak, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1318, 1320 (T.T.A.B. 1990), reh'g denied, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1322 (T.T.A.B. 1991) ("Under 
Section 14(c) of the Trademark Act, a registration existing for over five years may be 
canceled only on the specific grounds enumerated therein, none of which involves ownership 
of the registered mark. "). 
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(1) (1988). See Strang Corp. v. The Stouffer Corp., 16 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1309, 1310 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (holding a cancellation petition against respondent's 
mark, DON'S LIGHTHOUSE INN, was timely filed when filed on the fifth anniversary 
of the respondent's mark registration). 
98. 15 U .S.C. § 1064(2) (1988). This provision is applicable only to marks registered 
under the trademark laws which preceded the Lanham Act-the Act of March 3, 1881, 
or the Act of February 20, 1905. Today, this subsection is of no relevance. Merriam-
Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1755, 1757 n.5, 1757-1758 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (noting that while the mark COLLEGIATE mayor may not be incontestable, based 
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3. At any time if the mark becomes generic, has become abandoned, 
its registration was obtained by fraud or was contrary to § 1052 
(a)-(c) of the Lanham Act.99 
4. At any time if the mark registered under prior acts is not published 
according to the Lanham ActYlO 
5. At any time if the mark is a certification mark and either the 
registrant fails to control the mark, the registrant engages in the 
production or marketing of any goods or services to which the 
certification mark is applied, the registrant permits use of the 
mark other than to certify, or the registrant discriminately refuses 
to certify anyone who maintains appropriate standards. 101 
This provision constitutes what has become known as "incontestability 
in the Patent and Trademark Office."102 That is, the clear directive of 
on a failure to republish a 1905 Act registration, but not deciding this issue, presumably 
because the court found the combination mark WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE to possess 
secondary meaning); Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 
96, 102 (S.B.N.Y. 1989) (holding plaintiff, who had republished its marks containing the 
phrase AT-A-GLANCE in 1949, had those marks infringed by defendant). 
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1988). Prior to the 1988 amendment to the Lanham Act, 
there was much confusion about this subsection. Originally, this applied to "common 
descriptive name" and did not expressly say "generic." Christensen, supra note 33, at 
1098. Since the term "common descriptive name" is not defined in the Lanham Act, 
courts generally, but not always, equated it with genericism. See San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 531-32 n.7 ("A common 
descriptive name of a product or service is generic.") (citing 15 U .S.C. § 1 O64(c) , the 
precursor to § 1064(3». The Trademark Law Amendment Act of 1988 put this controversy 
to rest by changing "common descriptive name" to "generic" in § 1000(c). 
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(4) (1988). See Sylvester J. Liddy, The Lanham Act-An 
Analysis, 37 TRADEMARK REP. 87, 100-02 (1947) (recommending and explaining republication 
of marks registered under the 1905 or 1920 Acts); Walter J. Derenberg, Foreign Law 
Aspects oj the New Trade-Mark Act oj 1946, 37 TRADEMARK REp. 711, 714, 726-30 (1947) 
(discussing renewal, registration, and republication of foreign marks previously registered 
under the 1905 or 1920 Acts). 
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (1988). Community of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, 
Inc., 303 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1962) (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 064(d)(4) , a prior version of § 
1064(5) and granting summary judgment to plaintiff for defendant's infringement of 
plaintiff's certification mark ROQUEFORT.) The court noted that "a certification mark 
... must be made available without discrimination 'to certify the goods ... of any 
person who maintains the standards or conditions which such mark certifies.' " [d. at 
497 (emphasis in original); Opticians Ass'n of Am. v. Independent Opticians of Am., 920 
F.2d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) inapplicable because the marks 
involved were trademarks or collective marks, not certification marks, and this section 
applies to marks registered as certification marks only). 
102. GILSON, supra note 10, § 4.03(1). This is known as "incontestability in the 
Patent and Trademark Office" because a party can file a petition to cancel a mark only 
with the Patent and Trademark Office. Although the Lanham Act gives courts authority 
to "rectify the register," 15 U.S.C. § 1119, an actual petition to cancel a mark is only 
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section 14(1) is that after the mark has been registered for five years, 
a petition to cancel the registration will not be accepted by the Patent 
and Trademark Office,103 even if the registrant has failed to file affidavits 
with the Patent and Trademark Office. 
This is the first step of the incontestability analysis. Once a mark 
is registered for five years, potentially harmed third parties may not file 
to cancel it. A third party may sue for infringement, but that third party 
may not petition the Patent and Trademark Office to cancel the regis-
tration. 
The main import of section 15, the next step of incontestability 
application, is to clarify the meaning of incontestability (to the extent it 
can be clarified). Incontestability refers to the "right of the registrant 
to use such registered mark in commerce for the goods or services on 
or in connection with which such registered mark has been in continuous 
use for five consecutive years . . . and is still in use in commerce." 104 
This also is the source of the Section 15 Affidavit that the Patent and 
Trademark Office requires before acknowledging statutory incontesta-
bility}OS 
Section 15 largely applies to prior users of the same mark on similar 
goods. Section 15 is meant to protect third parties who were using a 
mark before the registrant. 106 That is, granting a registrant incontestable 
status of its mark is subject to the four conditions set forth in section 
15. These include the following: 
1. There are no final decisions of any court adverse to the registrant's 
interests. 100 
2. There is no proceeding pending before the Patent and Trademark 
Office involving the rights of the registrant. 108 
filed with the Patent and Trademark Office. Unless otherwise noted, this Article deals 
only with statutory incontestability and not this form of de facto incontestability. Courts 
have confused, from time to time, statutory incontestability with de facto incontestability 
and ignored the statutory requirements discussed infra to grant incontestability in a validity 
or infringement setting even though no § 15 Affidavits were filed. 
103. In fact, the implied negative has been the manner in which § 14 has been 
applied. That is, unless stipulated in § 14, petitions for cancellation on other grounds 
will be denied. See Christensen, supra note 33. 
104. 15 U .S.C. § 1065 (1988). 
105. Affidavit or declaration under § IS, 37 C.F.R. § 2.167 (1991). 
106. Christensen, supra note 33, at 1202. 
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1065(1) (1988). See Texas Pig Stands v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l, 
951 F.2d 684, 694 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding plaintiff's mark PIO SANDWICH incontestable 
despite a sixty-two year old decision finding the mark unprotectable, because that prior 
decision simply dissolved a temporary injunction; it did not act as a final decision adverse 
to plaintiff's claim of ownership). . 
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1065(2) (1988). See Strang Corp. v. Stouffer Corp., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 
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3. A Section 15 Affidavit is filed with the Patent and Trademark 
Office. 109 
4. The mark has not become generic. 110 
Section 15 also specifies the scope of incontestable rights. The first 
sentence of section 15111 has been interpreted to mean that incontestability 
is limited to those goods on which the mark has been used for the 
requisite five-year period. ll2 
Section 15 specifies the substance of incontestability. It is not the 
trademark itself that becomes incontestable, as some courts mistakenly 
articulate. l13 Rather, the registrant's right to use the mark on the goods 
1309, 1310 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (holding respondent's mark DON'S LIGHTHOUSE not in-
contestable because petitioner filed a cancellation petition by the fifth anniversary of 
respondent's mark's registration, which was still pending prior to the expiration of five 
years of continuous use); Sizzler Family Steak Houses v. Western Sizzlin Steak House, 
793 F.2d 1529, 1540-41 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding fatal to the plaintiff's claim of incon-
testability in the mark SIZZLIN the fact that the lawsuit at issue had commenced prior 
to the plaintiff's filing of its § 15 Affidavit). 
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1065(3) (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 2.167; 815 Tonawanda St. Corp. v. 
Fay's Drug Co., 842 F.2d 643, 646 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding no infringement because 
plaintiff had not proved it held rights to the service mark FAY'S prior to the defendant's 
registration of the same; court found that the defendant's mark became incontestable 
upon filing a § 15 Affidavit). 
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1065(4) (1988). This Section also was amended with the 1988 
Amendments. Under the prior version, this Section read "common descriptive name" of 
the goods. This was changed to read "generic name" of the goods because that is how 
courts had come to interpret it. Texas Pig Stands v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l, 951 F.2d 
684, 691-93 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding the plaintiff's trademark PIG SANDWICH not generic 
and, therefore, not subject to this defense); Seaboard Seed Co. v. Bemis Co., Inc., 632 
F. Supp. 1133 (N.D. III. 1986) (finding plaintiff's trademark QUICK GREEN suggestive, 
not generic and, therefore, not subject to this defense); but see Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. 
General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding the defendant's 
trademark MONOPOLY had become generic and lost its incontestable status). 
111. The first sentence of § 15 reads as follows: "[T]he right of the registrant to 
use such registered mark in commerce for the goods or services on or in connection with 
which such registered mark has been in continuous use for five consecutive years .... " 
15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988). 
112. Christensen, supra note· 33, at 1203. For example, in one case, the registrant 
registered his mark for use on air-conditioning equipment. The second-comer registered 
the same mark for u)e on heating equipment. The first registrant was enjoined from using 
his mark on heating equipment because the second-corner's registration had become in-
contestable for those goods. See Borg-Warner Corp v. York-Shipley, Inc., 127 U.S.P.Q. 
42 (N.D. III. 1960), modified on other grounds, 293 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 939 (1961). But see Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 672 
(7th Cir. 1982) (finding it reasonable for the defendant, who sought to use the mark 
MONEY STORE for money-lending purposes, to believe that the plaintiff's "pending 
registration for advertising services gave [plaintiff] no prior rights in the mark for money-
lending purposes"). 
113. See Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 1982) 
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on its Section 15 Affidavit becomes incontestable. In other words, the 
registration becomes incontestable, not the mark itself. 
Finally, section 33 is the "cutting edge of incontestability." 114 Section 
33(a) applies to registrations which have not become incontestable. Section 
33(b) applies to registrations that have become incontestable. Section 33(a) 
states that a trademark registration shall be prima Jacie evidence of the 
validity of the mark, the validity of the registration of the mark, the 
registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the owner's exclusive right 
to use the registered mark on the goods or services specified in the 
registration. 115 Section 33(b) states that an incontestable registration shall 
be conclusive evidence of the validity of the mark, the validity of the 
registration of the mark, the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of 
the owner's exclusive right to use the registered mark on the goods or 
services specified in the registration. 1I6 The key distinction between 33(a) 
. and 33(b)-between non-incontestable and incontestable registrations-is 
that 33(a) grants prima Jacie evidence while 33(b) grants conclusive ev-
idence of trademark rights. 1I7 
Once a registration has attained incontestable status, it may not be 
challenged except for the eight enumerated reasons set forth in section 
33 of the Lanham ACt. IIB Once a mark becomes incontestable, it is subject 
only to the following defects or defenses: 
("Five years after registration of the mark, however, the mark is 'incontestable' by private 
parties . . . . ") (emphasis added). 
114. Christensen, supra note 33, at 1205. 
115. 15 U .S.C. § 1115(a) (1988). See Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Cassini Tailors, Inc., 
764 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (finding the plaintiff's registrations of the mark OLEO CASSIN I 
presented prima facie evidence of its "exclusive right to use the marks on the various 
clothing and clothing-related products set forth in the [non-incontestable) registrations" 
and defendant's use of the mark CASSINI for tailoring services infringed the plaintiff's 
right). 
116. 15 U .S.C. § 1115(b) (1988). It is significant that Congress chose the emphasized 
"and" rather than "or." It is largely the use of this "and" that clearly demonstrates 
Congress' intent to inappropriately expand trademarks protection beyond that recognized 
at common law. See infra notes 247-50 and accompanying text. 
117. See Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Cassini Tailors, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (W.O. 
Tex. 1990) (finding that although the plaintiff's non-incontestable marks benefitted from 
§ 1115(a) prima facie evidence of exclusive use, its incontestable marks were subject to 
§ 1115(b)'s presumption of conclusive evidence of exclusive use). 
118. 15 U.S.C. § II1S(b)(l)-(8) (1988). See American Express v. American Express 
Limousine Serv., 772 F. Supp. 729, 732 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting the plaintiff's motion 
for a preliminary injunction preventing the defendant from using the mark AMERICAN 
EXPRESS and noting the exclusive list of defenses available to the defendant, and addressing 
the eighth, laches); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 372-73 (7th 
Cir. 1976) (holding the defendant infringed the plaintiff's rights to the mark EVEREADY 
and listing the seven defenses in the statute at that time, finding none of them applicable, 
and then discussing several of them in the context of the offensive use of incontestability). 
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1. The registration was obtained fraudulently; 119 
2. The mark was abandoned by the registrant;l20 
3. The mark is being misused and no longer indicates the registrant 
as the source of the goods on which it is used;121 
4. The mark is being used otherwise than as a trademark to describe 
a good or service; 122 
5. The registrant registered the mark subsequent to a regional user 
although the registrant has prior use nationally; 123 
6. The alleged infringing mark was registered and used first;l24 
7. The mark is or has been used to violate the antitrust laws of 
the United States;12S and 
119. Orient Express Trading Co. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 842 F.2d 650, 653 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (finding that the plaintiff had committed fraud on the Patent and Trademark 
Office when it had "greatly exaggerated" the date of its first use of the mark ORIENT 
EXPRESS, the scope of its use, and its continuous use; also, the plaintiff had filed 
seventeen applications in anticipation of litigation, which the court found "disingenuous"); 
General Car and Truck Leasing v. General Rent-A-Car, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1398, 1401 
(S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff committed fraud on the Patent and Trademark 
Office when it registered the mark GENERAL and alleged it had been used on boats 
and aircraft, when in fact the plaintiff knew it never had). 
120. Imperial Tobacco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1579-83 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (finding that the plaintiff had abandoned its mark JPS when it had not used the 
mark for the two years. immediately preceding the defendant's filing of its cancellation 
petition). 
121. General Motors Corp. v. Gibson Chern. & Oil, 786 F.2d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 
1986) (finding that although the plaintiff licensed the mark DEXRON II to other businesses, 
these licensees were not misrepresenting the source of the product and, therefore, the 
mark was not subject to cancellation under this Section). 
122. WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding 
that a local television station's use of the phrase BOSTON MARATHON a fair use 
because the mark is used not as a trademark, but for descriptive purposes only, to inform 
viewers that the station will broadcast the race). 
123. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 374 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(finding that the plaintiff could not argue incontestability with regard to the defendant 
because the defendant had acquired the right to use the mark EVER-READY prior to 
plaintiff's registration). But see Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 
717 F. Supp. 96, 111-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that the defendant did not establish 
prior use of the mark AT-A-GLANCE because it had not acquired state or common law 
rights to the mark, the use it alleged was not continuous from a point prior to the 
plaintiff's registration, and any such use was not on the products involved in the lawsuit). 
124. GILSON, supra note 10, § 4.03(3), at 4-32.20-21; DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEW 
TRADE-MARK MANUAL 143 (1947). 
125. Prior to the passage of the Lanham Act, most of the discussion regarding § 
33 related to this subsection regarding violations of antitrust laws of the United States. 
In fact, the greater import of § 33 and what it did to trademark law in general was 
comparatively ignored. See Congressional Record House June 25, 1946; Williamson, supra 
note 92, at 409-10. 
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8. The registrant has violated common law rules of equity such as 
laches. 126 
2. Incontestability Is a Substantive Change to the Common Law of 
Trademarks.-Prior to passage of the Lanham Act, trademark registration 
was considered to be only procedural. Trademark registration granted 
no new substantive rights to an owner .127 In fact, the common law notion 
of trademark rights was that the trademark existed independent of any 
statute and only arose out of prior exclusive appropriation and use. 128 
Most significantly, in E.F. Prichard the Sixth Circuit stated that the title 
to a trademark is independent of its registration. 129 Prior to the Lanham 
Act, trademark registration had little, if any, meaning in the courtS.130 
When the Lanham Act was being discussed in committee, several 
Senators and other witnesses testified that the Act was intended to codify 
existing common law and not change substantive trademark law.13I In 
fact, the first draft of one section-section 34-stated that nothing in 
the Act was meant to change the existing common law of trademarks. l32 
126. American Express v. American Express Limousine Serv., 772 F. Supp. 729, 
732 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (granting the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction preventing 
the defendant from using the mark AMERICAN EXPRESS, and denying the defense of 
laches). 
127. United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 99 (1918) (finding United 
Drug Co.'s registration of the mark REX did not give any rights beyond those at common 
law). "Registration creates no rights in a trade-mark .... It deprives no one of any rights 
possessed before, and confers upon the registrant no property rights that he would not 
have without such registration." ROOERS, GOOD WILL, supra note 12, at 109. 
128. E.F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F.2d 512, 518 (6th Cir. 
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 763 (1944). See also ROGERS, GOOD WILL, supra note 12, 
at 109. 
129. E.F. Prichard, 136 F.2d at 518. 
130. Trademarks: Hearings Before the Comm. on Patents, Subcomm. on Trade-
marks, Hearings on H.R. 4744 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 106-07 (1939) (statement of Mr. 
Rogers) ("Of course the purpose of the incontestable business is to clean house. The 
existing law is that a trade-mark of the registrant may be canceled at any time, and the 
courts interpret 'at any time' to mean just that. ") 
131. 92 CONGo REc. 7524 (1946). Representative Lanham stated that incontestability 
is "not intended to enlarge, restrict, amend or modify the substantive law of trademarks 
either as set out in other sections of the act or as heretofore applied by the courts under 
prior laws." Lanham also indicated that the Act itself "creates new rights, some of which 
are substantive and others procedural." 92 CONGo REC. 7524. Apparently, Lanham believed 
other aspects of the Lanham Act modified existing common law but incontestability did 
not. 
132. "Nothing in this Act shall entitle the registrant to interfere with or restrain 
the use by any person of the same trade-mark or of a similar trade-mark for 
the same or like goods or services when such person by himself or his predecessors 
in business has continuously used such trade-mark form a date prior to the use 
or registration, whichever is the earlier, by the registrant or his predecessors." 
Trade-marks: Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-marks of the House 
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However, when it was pointed out to the committee that the proposed 
section 34 would be inconsistent with the Lanham Act's provisions re-
garding incontestability, 133 section 34 was promptly deleted. l34 
Courts, however, have refused to recognize the changes brought about 
by incontestability. Several courts since the enactment of the Lanham 
Act have acted as if nothing, in fact, had changed. This is peculiar 
because section 33 asserts that an incontestable registration shall be 
conclusive proof of the validity and ownership of the owner's right to 
use the mark. This has not stopped some courts from stating that 
trademark registration is only a method of recording ownership for 
purposes of serving notice of a claim of ownership and informing the 
public of that claim of ownership.13s 
Even the United States Supreme Court appeared to be unaware of 
the potential import of a passing statement it made in Park 'N Fly. In 
her majority opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that incontestability was 
"[a]mong the new protections created by the Lanham Act."136 This 
statement by the Supreme Court is completely at odds with the express 
legislative intent of Congress when it enacted the Lanham Act. The 
Lanham Act was meant to codify common law and not to add new 
rights. The Supreme Court went a long way in its simple statement to 
recognize that the Lanham Act, especially through the incontestability 
provisions, substantively changed the existing common law of trademarks. 
Not all courts have accepted this, as is evident in the confusion that 
arises whenever courts are called upon to adjudicate an issue regarding 
incontestability. This confusion results from two competing directives: 
legislative history and common law on one side and the language of the 
statute on the other. When both legislative history and the common law 
Comm. on Patents, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1938) (reading of the bill H.R. 9041 into 
the record) [hereinafter Hearings). The United States Trademark Association took this to 
mean that "nothing in this act shalI affect any common-law rights acquired by a third 
party prior to the use or registration of the registrant." [d. at 64. 
133. EspecialIy the current § 33, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988). 
134. Hearings, supra note 132, at 64. The USTA expressed concern that § 34(b) 
would remove "for the most part the incontestability privilege with which section 13 vests 
the registered trade-mark owner after a period of 5 years." 
135. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp 973, 979 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1971), a/I'd, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972) ("Registration of a trademark is at best 
but a method of recording for the purpose of serving notice of a claim of ownership, 
and informing the public and dealers with reference thereto."); see also B.B. Pen Co. v. 
Brown & Bigelow, 92 F. Supp. 272, 274 (D. Minn. 1950) (finding no infringement because 
the parties used the mark B & B in different trades); Griesedieck Western Brewery Co. 
v. Peoples Brewing Co., 149 F.2d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 1945) (alIowing the parties concurrent 
use of the mark STAG in geographicalIy distant territories). 
136. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. DolIar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985) 
(emphasis added). 
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tell the courts that there is nothing new in the Lanham Act, when in 
actuality there is, courts are very likely to be confused. 
D. Congress' Express/37 Rationale Behind Incontestability 
Incontestability in the Lanham Act was premised on the British 
system. 138 The legislative history of the Lanham Act indicates that Con-
gress' rationale for including an incontestability provision was to make 
a certain date after which trademark rights would vest. 139 After that date, 
other trademark users would be on notice that an incontestable registration 
was subject only to certain defenses or defects.l40 This was thought to 
be similar to the concept of adverse possession or quieting title. 141 That 
is, at some point in time, it should be clear who owns the trademark, 
because the alternative would be chaos and confusion. Giving trademark 
owners a certain date after which their rights would become incontestable 
would provide clarity and predictability in the law,142 so the argument 
goes. 
137. I use the term "express" here as opposed to "hidden" or "subliminal"-a 
point that will be developed below. See infra note 249 and accompanying text. 
138. The British Trade Marks Registration Act, 38 & 39 Vict, Ch. 91 § 3 (1875); 
Fletcher, supra note 85. 
139. Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the House Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the 
House Comm. on Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 106-07 (1939) (statement of Edward S. 
Rogers); Betty Ferber, Trade-marks-Incontestability-Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready 
Inc., 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 396, 425 (1976); Casper W. Ooms & George E. 
Frost, Incontestability, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 220, 223 (1949). 
140. Hearings on H.R. 4744 before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks, Comm. on 
Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 105-06 (1939) (remarks of Byerly); 92 CONGo REC. 7524 
(remarks of Representative Lanham). 
141. Naresh, supra note 8, at 982-84 (arguing that incontestability cannot be ra-
tionalized on the grounds of adverse possession because analogies to statutes of limitation 
only address the desirability of shifting an extant property right from one person to 
another and do not deal with the underlying concept); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 
& Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985); Hearings on H.R. 82 before the Subcomm. of 
the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1944) (statement of D. Robert); 
Hearings on H.R. 82 before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 
2d Sess., 21 (1944) (remarks of Representative Lanham); id. at 21, 113 (testimony of 
Daphne Robert, ABA Committee on Trade Mark Legislation); Hearings on H.R. 102 et 
al. before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong., 
1st Sess., 73 (1941) (remarks of Representative Lanham); But see infra notes 241-43 and 
accompanying text for the proposition that the use of property rhetoric is inappropriate. 
142. Hearings on H.R. 4744 before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks, Comm. on 
Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 128 (1944) (statement of Earl H. Thomson) ("a trademark 
adopter, when he has registered his trade-mark, wants to feel that after a period of time, 
certainly he will know that he owns that trade-mark and can maintain his right"); Ooms 
& Frost, supra note 139, at 232-33; Sylvester J. Liddy, The Lanham Act-An Analysis, 
37 TRADEMARK REP. 87, 94 (1947) (quoting Caspar W. Ooms, the Commissioner of 
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It is particularly troublesome that Congress and certain commentators 
have chosen to use this property rhetoric when describing incontestability. 
As will be developed below, because trademarks themselves are not subject 
to property ownership, it is incorrect to use property rhetoric to describe 
them.143 This use of property rhetoric misfocuses the analysis and is the 
cause of the adjudicatory chaos currently existing among courts in in-
contestability cases. 
II. EFFECT OF INCONTESTABILITY 
Simply stated, the effects of an incontestable trademark registration 
may be summarized as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and holder of an incontestable registration does not 
have to prove secondary meaning for a weak mark that may 
otherwise be invalid and undefensible;l44 
2. Defendant non-holder of an incontestable mark is restricted to 
the eight enumerated attacks or defenses in section 33(b);145 
3. Some courts equate an incontestable registration with a "strong 
mark;"l46 and 
o 4. Plaintiff holders of descriptive marks are statutorily protected 
from attacks on the validity of their marks. 
The life of the incontestability doctrine in trademark law has been 
quite confused in a variety of respects. For the first forty or so years 
of the existence of the incontestability doctrine, courts and scholars were 
not able to agree on whether incontestability could be used only as a 
defense to a challenge to the validity of a mark,147 or if it also could 
Patents. Ooms said incontestability would give businesses the "assurance that [their marks) 
will not forever remain an object of attack" by other businesses using similar marks. 
Address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the A.N.A. at Atlantic City (Sept. 30, 1946». 
See also F.T. Alexandra Mahaney, Incontestability; The Park 'N Fly Decision, 33 V.C.L.A. 
L. REv. 1149, 1186 (1986) (recognizing that incontestability provides security and stability 
for mark owners). 
143. See infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text. For example, McCarthy compares 
§ 15 requirements to recording title to real estate. MCCARTHY, supra note 70, § 32:44. 
See also DAPHNE ROBERT, THE NEW TRADEMARK MANUAL 133 (1947) ("On its face, it 
would appear [incontestability] means that at some time the title to the property right in 
the mark is quieted and the rights of the registrant are forever secure"). 
144. Although some commentators argue that it should be impossible for a mark 
that is merely descriptive (Le. lacking secondary meaning) to be registered, examples are 
numerous including the mark in Park 'N Fly. 
145. Excluding any defenses defendant may have to the likelihood of confusion. 
146. See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text, and Appendix A infra notes 
257-389 and accompanying text. 
147. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1983), 
rev'd, 469 U.S. 189 (1985); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Corp. of Cal., 694 
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be used offensively to obviate the general requirement that the plaintiff 
show secondary meaning in a trademark infringement action.148 
The confusion started in 1955 when Assistant Commissioner of Patents 
and Trademarks Leeds announced his position regarding the effect of 
incontestability: "The effect of 'incontestability' is a defensive and not 
an offensive effect. To put it another way, when the right to use a given 
mark has become incontestable, the owner's rights in the mark are in 
no wise [sic) broadened .... " 149 
Based upon this distinction, a split in the circuits developed sur-
rounding the effect of incontestability. Some circuits concluded that an 
incontestable mark could be used only as a procedural, defensive mech-
anism to counter challenges to the validity of the mark. These courts 
held that a registrant could not use the incontestable status of a trademark 
to enjoin use by others if, for example, the mark is merely descriptive. ISO 
F.2d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983); Tillamook County 
Creamery Ass'n v. Tillmook Cheese and Dairy Ass'n, 345 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied, 382 U.S. 903 (1965); Wrist-Rocket Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Saunders Archery Co., 516 
F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 870 (1975); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray 
Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 982 (M.D. Tenn. 1971), afl'd, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 
1972); Haviland & Co. v. Johann Haviland China Corp., 269 F. Supp. 928, 936, 954 
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); RUDOLPH CALLMANN, 4 UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 2075-
76 (2d ed. 1950); VANDENBUROH, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE 467 (2d ed. 1968). 
See generally Pattishall, supra note 43, at 215 (most commentators believed from the 
initial enactment of incontestability that it was only a defensive tool). 
148. United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 639 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 1981); 
Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 981 (1981); John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108, 113-14 (5th Cir. 
1966) (finding plaintiff's mark HOLLOWAY HOUSE not subject to any but the enumerated 
defenses); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 377 (7th Cir. 1976); 
Ansul Co. v. Malter Int'l Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 596, 599-600 (T.T.A.B. 1978); Seiler's, 
Inc. v. Hickory Valley Farm, Inc., 139 U.S.P.Q. 460, 461 (T.T.A.B. 1963) (finding 
incontestability to be conclusive evidence of plaintiff's right to use its mark); Jockey Int'l, 
Inc. v. Burkard, 185 U.S.P.Q. 201, 206 (S.D. Cal. 1975) (offensive because the defendant 
did not counterclaim for cancellation, yet the court still allowed the plaintiff to rely on 
incontestability); Fletcher, supra note 85, at 96 (arguing the plain meaning of the statute 
is that there is no distinction). See generally Pasquale A. Razzano, Incontestability: Should 
It Be Given Any Effect in a Likelihood of Confusion Determination?, 82 TRADEMARK 
REP. 409, 411 (1992). 
149. Rand McNally & Co. v. Christmas Club, 105 U.S.P.Q. 499, 500-501 (Comm'r 
Pts. 1955), afl'd on other grounds, 242 F.2d 776 (C.C.P.A. 1957). There is some indication 
that this entire distinction was based inappropriately on Leeds's comments. Apparently 
Leeds only meant that by "offensive use" a registrant could not claim a wider range of 
goods than identified in his application. By defensive effect, Leeds apparently only meant 
that the registration became incontestable as to the goods identified in the registrant's § 
15 Affidavit. See Mahaney, supra note 142, at 1176; Fletcher, supra note 85,.at 95 (Leeds's 
comments were dicta and taken out of context) .. 
150. Mahaney, supra note 142, at 1175; ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, 
INTELLEC'TUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIOHTS § 14.6, at 213 (1983). 
o 
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Others, based on the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Union Carbide, found 
no such distinction in the Lanham Act. 
The offensive/defensive distinction controversy arose not only over 
Leeds's "opinion," but also over the precise interpretation of the Lanham 
Act. Superficially, the offensive/defensive argument has some appeal. 
After all, section 33(b), the primary incontestability provision of the 
Lanham Act, is titled "Incontestability; defenses. "ISI At first blush, it 
would appear that those items which appear in section 33(b) only apply 
to defensive uses of an incontestable mark. This was the reasoning of 
the Ninth Circuit in rejecting plaintiff's claims of trademark infringement 
in its opinion in Park 'N Fly.IS2 According to the Ninth Circuit, the 
Lanham Act did not allow a trademark registrant to use the incontestable 
status of its mark in an offensive manner, especially when the mark was 
merely descriptive. The incontestability provisions of the Lanham Act, 
the court argued, only applied as defenses to claims that the mark was 
invalid; incontestability did not apply when the plaintiff was seeking to 
enforce the mark against others. 
By 1983, the Ninth Circuit was the only federal circuit court that 
enforced the offensive/defensive distinction in the use of an incontestable 
trademark. In 1976, the Seventh Circuit overruled John Morel & Co. v. 
Reliable Packing Co., IS3 one of the primary cases recognizing a distinction 
between the offensive and defensive use of a trademark, and outright 
rejected the interpretation of the Lanham Act which allowed for a 
distinction between offensive and defensive use of a trademark, in the 
case of Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc. ls4 The Seventh Circuit 
stated that "[t]here is no defensive/offensive distinction in the statute, 
and we do not believe one should be judicially engrafted on to it. .. . "ISS 
This put to rest the offensive/defensive distinction in every circuit but 
the Ninth Circuit. The United States Supreme Court had to overrule 
expressly the Ninth Circuit to convince it that the offensive/defensive 
distinction analysis of incontestability was dead. ls6 
This, as well as other examples of confusion, indicates that there is 
something inherently unclear about the role and objectives of incontest-
ability. If the statute were as clear as the Supreme Court believes, IS7 
these would be easy cases. Given that incontestability continues to be 
151. 15 U.S.C. § 111S(b) (1988). 
152. Park 'N Fly. Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc .• 718 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1983). 
rev'd, 469 U.S. 189 (1985). 
153. 295 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1961). 
154. 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976). cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976). 
155. [d. at 377. 
156. Park 'N Fly. 469 U.S. at 197. 
157. [d. at 194-97. 
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applied inconsistently, even in light of Park 'N Fly, there must be 
something about the concept of incontestability itself that prevents courts 
from analyzing and applying it in a consistent manner. It should be 
abolished, or at least reconsidered. 
III. CURRENT ApPLICATION OF INCONTESTABILITY 
The offensive/defensive distinction has not been the only split in the 
circuits regarding incontestability. In fact, "[t]here is probably no section 
of the Act which has caused more confusion in the courts than section 
33(b) .... " 1$8 A potentially more consequential split between the circuits, 
and even within each circuit, has developed regarding the issue of the 
weight a trial court should give to evidence of an incontestable registration. 
This is generally known as the strength of plaintiff's mark. The strength 
of a trademark generally means the mark's "tendency to identify the 
goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular ... source."IS9 
The issue of whether a plaintiff's mark is strong is usually a primary 
inquiry when determining if a third party's use of the same or similar 
mark infringes the plaintiff's mark. l60 Although the specific wording 
differs, all circuits call this the likelihood of confusion test. 161 All circuits 
have a multi-factor test that is applied to determine if the relevant 
consumer would be likely to be confused regarding the source of the 
alleged infringer's goods. Besides the strength of the mark, some of the 
other factors include the similarity of the marks in sound, meaning, and 
appearance, the similarity of the consuming public, the similarity of the 
channels of trade, the sophistication of the consumer, the intent of the 
defendant, and any evidence of actual confusion. Actual confusion is 
not required in any circuit-the test is the likelihood of confusion. These 
factors are generally referred to as the Polaroid factors. 162 
Many expected that the Supreme Court in Park 'N Fly would settle 
all issues regarding incontestability including whether incontestability con-
tributes to the mark's strength. However, Park 'N Fly fell far short of 
158. GILSON, supra note 10, § 4.03[3), at 4-29. 
159. MeG regor-Doniger , Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979). 
160. This is also significant because most of the other elements of incontestability 
that have been the source of confusion have centered on more procedural matters. However, 
the strength of the mark often dictates whether the plaintiff will prevail. Therefore, whether 
incontestability contributes to the strength of the mark is more than an issue of whether 
the registrant can successfully defend an attack on the validity of its registration, but 
rather whether the plaintiff will actually prevail in its infringement action. 
161. MCCARTHY, supra note 70, § 23:1. 
162. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry 
Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979). 
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expectations. Rather than clarify incontestability, the circuit courts ap-
parently are now even more confused about incontestability than before 
Park <N Fly. The table below depicts each court's specific holding re-
garding whether incontestability automatically confers "strength" to a 
trademark, whether incontestability is merely one element of that court's 
strength analysis, whether that court ignores incontestability in determining 
if a mark is strong, or if that court expressly excludes incontestability 
in making its strength analysis. 
FEDERAL COURT HOLDINGS REGARDING STRENGTH 
OF THE MARK SINCE PARK 'N FLY 163 
CIRCUIT Expressly does Ignores incontesta- Considers incon- Expressly 
not consider bility relative to testability an holds 
incontestability strength element of incontestability 
relative to strength creates 
strength strength 
First D. Puerto Rico/ D. Rhode Island/ 
D. Mass.! D. New Hamp-
CIRCUIT shire/D. Mass. 
Second S.D.N.Y S.D.N.Y,!CIR- S.D.N.Y.!D. D. Conn. 
CUlT Conn. 
Third D.NJ. CIRCUIT E.D. Pa. 
Fourth M.D.N.C. D.S.C. W.D. Va. 
Fifth CIRCUIT/W.D. S.D. Tex. 
Tex. 
Sixth CIRCUIT /E.D. S.D. Ohio CIRCUIT/ 
Mich. E.D. Mich. 
Seventh CIRCUIT N.D.III. 
Eighth D. Minn. D. Minn.!D. 
Neb/W.D. Mo. 
Ninth CIRCUIT/C.D. CIRCUIT/D. 
Cal. Ariz. 
Tenth CIRCUIT 
Eleventh N.D. Ga'!S.D. S.D. Fla.!M.D. CIRCUIT 
Fla. Fla. 
Federal CIRCUIT 
D.C. (no cases) (no cases) (no cases) (no cases) 
163. See Appendix A, infra notes 257-389 and accompanying text, for an annotated 
version of this table. 
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As is evident from the table above, there is absolutely no consistency 
within the courts regarding the use of incontestability in the strength 
of the mark analysis. With so much inconsistency, there can be no 
logical explanation for the divergence between and within the circuits 
regarding the question of whether an incontestable registration creates 
a presumption of a strong trademark. Not only are the circuit courts 
confused and inconsistent, the district courts within each circuit also are 
inconsistent and do not necessarily follow their circuit court's rulings. 
For example, the Southern District of New York has variously held 
in the last five years that incontestability does not impact the strength 
of a mark,l64 that incontestability will be ignored relative to the strength 
of the mark,165 and that incontestability should be one of the factors 
that goes into the analysis of whether or not the plaintiff's mark is 
strong. l66 Although one commentator has argued that the differences 
between the circuits in the application of section 33(b) could lead to 
forum shopping,167 the application of incontestability is actually so con-
fused that there is not even enough predictability within most circuits 
to encourage forum shopping. 
In cases originally filed in the Southern District of Florida, one 
court ignored incontestability,168 one court considered it a factor, 169 and 
the Eleventh Circuit concluded incontestability to be dispositive on the 
issue of strength,l1° Clearly, even within the circuits, the district courts 
are confused about the relevance of incontestability. 
This inconsistency and split between the circuits is best exemplified 
by two cases, one out of the Eleventh Circuit and one out of the Seventh 
Circuit, that came to opposite conclusions regarding the strength of the 
mark analysis. In ·Dieter v. B. & H. Industries oj Southwest Florida, 171 
the Eleventh Circuit held that the trademark SHUTTERWORLD was 
164. Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96, 121 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Marjorica S.A. v. Majorca InCI, Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 92,98 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988). 
165. W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7609 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 702 F. Supp. 
1031, 1035-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989). 
166. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Bachman Co., 704 F. Supp. 432, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); 
Marshak v. Sheppard, 666 F. Supp. 590, 601 (S.D. N.Y. 1987). 
167. Kathy 1. McKnight, Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act: What Effect in Trademark 
Infringement Litigation?, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 329, 356 (1982). 
168. Chase Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Chase Manhattan Fin. Serv., Inc., 681 F. 
Supp. 771 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 
169. Burger King Corp. v. Hall, 770 F. Supp. 633, 637 (S.D. Fla. 1991). 
170. Dieter v. B. & H. Indus. of Southwest Fla., 880 F.2d 322 (11th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, III S. Ct. 369 (1990). 
171. Id. 
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incontestable and, therefore, valid and strong even if the mark was 
initially improperly allowed registration. The fact that the registration 
was incontestable was the controlling factor. Because the registration 
was incontestable, the mark was presumptively strong whenever the holder 
of that mark enforced it against others. 172 
In Munters Corp. v. Matsui America, Inc.,m however, the Seventh 
Circuit held that although plaintiff's registration for the mark HONEY-
COMBE had become incontestable, that fact had no bearing on whether 
the mark was a strong mark for infringement purposes. Incontestability, 
the court reasoned, applied only to validity of a registration and not 
to a trademark infringement setting. 174 
In 1990, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify this issue 
when both Dieter and Munters were appealed. However, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in both cases. m Various district courts have 
recently started following the Dieter lead, indicating that incontestability 
is synonymous with strength, rather than the contrary Munters position. 176 
The Supreme Court in Park 'N Fly ignored the issue of strength, 
and in doing so it condoned the status quo. Whereas before Park 'N 
Fly there was confusion and divergence between the circuits over the 
offensive/defensive use of incontestable marks, and whereas prior to the 
Trademark Amendment Act of 1988 there was confusion over use of 
equitable defenses to an incontestable mark, there now exists confusion 
and inconsistency over whether incontestability can be used (and to what 
extent) in the strength of the mark analysis. 
Furthermore, although the Supreme Court set out to clarify incon-
testability in Park 'N Fly, it is apparent that it did not go far enough 
in its' analysis. Merely stating that incontestability was new with the 
Lanham Act and holding that an incontestable mark could not be attacked 
for being merely descriptive did not clarify incontestability for the lower 
federal courts. 
There have been two major attempts to clarify incontestability. The 
first was the Supreme Court's handling of Park 'N Fly. The second 
was the Trademark Revision Act of 1988, through which Congress added 
172. [d. at 328. 
173. 909 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1990). 
174. [d. It is indicative of judicial treatment of incontestability that the Northern 
District of Illinois refused to follow this bifurcation of the incontestability analysis. In 
Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enterprises, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13161 (N.D. Ill. 1992), 
the court chose to follow Sixth Circuit analysis and ruled that incontestability was evidence 
of a strong mark. 
175. Munters, 111 S. Ct. 591 (1990); Dieter, 111 S. Ct. 369 (1990). 
176. See, e.g., Barnes Group Inc. v. Connelly, Ltd. Partnership, 793 F. Supp. 1277 
(D. Del. 1992); Hesler Indus., Inc. v. Wing King, Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1066 (N.D. Ga. 
1992). 
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the eighth element to the enumerated defenses of section 33(b) to include 
equitable defenses. Yet, the courts are still hopelessly confused as to 
what this all means. Courts still apply incontestability one way in the 
Eleventh Circuit and a totally different way in the Seventh Circuit. 
District courts within these circuits are not even always in accord with 
their circuit courts on the application of incontestability. If courts have 
this much difficulty even after two major attempts at clarification, 
perhaps there is something more fundamentally wrong with incontest-
ability. Perhaps it is not the courts that are at fault, but the concept 
of incontestability that is hopelessly flawed. 
IV. THE ILLEGITIMACY OF TRADEMARK INCONTESTABILITY 
Incontestability is jurisprudentially unsustainable and should be re-
pealed primarily because it is a congressional attempt to grant property 
status to a trademark itself. At common law, trademarks themselves 
have never been property. In fact, it is very well settled common law 
that there are no rights whatsoever in a trademark alone. 177 In the Trade-
Mark Cases, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not have the 
authority to create new trademark rights because trademarks were not 
expressly provided for in the Constitution. Similarly, Congress' attempt 
to make trademarks themselves property via the incontestability provisions 
of the Lanham Act is suspect. To complicate matters further, courts 
generally use property rhetoric to describe trademarks themselves. This, 
as will be shown below, is quite problematic because there is, in actuality, 
no property right in the trademark itself. 
First, in the context of trademark discourse, what does "property" 
mean? When courts and lay persons speak of "property" they are usually 
referring to a tangible object from which the owner has rights to exclude 
others.178 In its earliest forms, property was land. 179 The concept of 
property was extended to include chattels in the nineteenth century. 180 
Intangibles, such as trademarks, were not considered property in the 
sense that land or chattels were considered property, because intangibles 
could not be held, moved, or possessed.1 81 
177. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 
1992); Mister Donut of Am., Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 1969). 
178. Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits 0/ Copyright: The Challenges 
o/Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343,1354 (1989). 
179. D. F. Libling, The Concept 0/ Property: Property in Intangibles, 94 LAW Q. 
REV. \03 (1978). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 104. 
HeinOnline -- 26 Ind. L. Rev. 553 1992-1993
1993] TRADEMARK INCONTESTABILITY 553 
Intangibles have become recognized as property because they dem-
onstrate some of the classical incidents of ownership. Patents and copy-
rights, for example, are subject to the same types of exclusive control 
and rights of alienation to which other, more classical, forms of property 
are subjected. This may be, in part, because patents and copyrights are 
specifically mentioned in the United States Constitution. 
Patent and copyright owners enjoy the "bundle of rights" notion 
of property. Their rights are divisible, freely alienable, and exclusive for 
the duration of statutory protection. 182 
Trademarks, on the other hand, enjoy none of the "bundle of 
rights" that other forms of property enjoy. Trademark holders possess 
only the right to exclude others from using that specific trademark on 
similar goods. Holders of marks possess the right to protect the sphere 
of interest in which they are using the mark by excluding others, but 
nothing more. 183 Mark holders do not possess a property right in the 
mark itself, because trademarks are nothing when devoid of the goodwill 
they have come to represent or the product on which they are used. 184 
In this sense, trademarks are completely distinct from patents and 
copyrights in their conceptual and jurisprudential grounding. The United 
States Constitution states in the Patent and Copyright Clause that authors 
~nd inventors will be given the exclusive right to use their inventions 
and writings "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."18s 
This clause applies only to copyrights and patents. 186 There is no cor-
responding "Trademark Clause" in the United States Constitution.I87 
Therefore, because the Constitution specifically refers to copyrights and 
patents, their conceptual grounding is distinct from trademarks. 188 Trade-
mark rights in the United States arise only out of use. 189 
Because the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution does 
not apply to trademarks, the Supreme Court struck down the Trademark 
Act of 1870 as unconstitutional in the Trade-Mark Cases.I 90 The Court 
182. See infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text. 
183. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879). 
184. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1302 (9th Cir. 
1992); Mister Donut of Am., Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 842 (9th Cir. 1969). 
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
186. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94. 
187. Person's Co., Ltd. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
188. Pattishall, supra note 22, at 456; Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: 
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 
1982 WIS. L. REV. 158 (1982). 
189. For an analysis of the new "intent-to-use" system of trademark protection 
and the extent to which it creates trademark rights (all of which is beyond the scope of 
this Article), see Hellwig, supra note 39. 
190. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 98-99. 
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held that Congress had to find a different constitutional grounding to 
grant new rights to trademark holders. To grant new trademark rights 
based on the Patent and Copyright Clause was invalid because that 
clause did not specifically mention trademarks. Congress constitutionally 
could enact a registration statute but not a statute that expanded trade-
mark rights because it did not have the express constitutional authority 
to do so. 
In the Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court also shed some light 
on the notion of trademarks as property. The Court stated that the 
rights in and to a trademark grow "out of its use, and not its mere 
adoption." 191 That is, courts will protect a trademark holder's right to 
exclude third parties for as long as the trademark owner does not abandon 
the mark, but courts will not protect the ownership of the mark devoid 
of any source-indicating function by use on goods. The Supreme Court 
came to this conclusion based on the common law notion that trademarks 
themselves are not property and not subject to ownership. 
Whether trademarks themselves are property subject to ownership 
should be analyzed using one of the well-accepted definitions of the 
concept of ownership, such as that of Honore. 192 Honore defines the 
leading incidents of ownership as including the following: 
1. The right to possess; 
2. The unfettered right to use; 
3. The right to manage; 
4. The right to the income; 
5. The right to the capital; 
6. The right to security; 
7. The incident of transmissibility; 
8. Absence of term; 
9. Prohibition of harmful use; 
10. Liability to execution; and 
11. Residuarity.193 
Honore defines the "right to possess" as the "exclusive physical 
control of a thing, or to have such control as the nature of the thing 
admits."194 Honore claims that this, the primary incident of ownership, 
191. [d. at 94 (emphasis in original). 
192. A.M. HONORE, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (A.G. Guest 
ed., 1961). Honore's Ownership is recognized as one of the classical pieces in the property 
field of defining exactly what is property. Its brevity and clarity greatly adds to the 
accessibility others lack. 
193. [d. at 8. An analysis of each incident should be unnecessary. What follows 
is an application of the primary incidents to trademarks as property. 
194. [d. at 9. 
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implies the exclusive control of a thing and the right to remain in 
control. 195 
Trademarks do not even pass this first hurdle. Trademark holders 
do not have exclusive control of their marks. Various other entities may 
have siOlUltaneous control of the exact trademark claimed to be "owned" 
by that competing entity. Not only are trademarks subject to the "fair 
use"l96 by others, trademark holders are powerless to control, for ex-
ample, the use by others of their mark on unsimilar goods,197 or their 
mark on similar goods sold to different consumers.198 Thus, trademark 
holders do not have the exclusive- right to control their mark and, 
therefore, do not have the exclusive right to possess the mark as defined 
by Honore. 
Furthermore, trademark holders do not have the unrestricted right 
to use the mark. Trademark holders may not use their mark on a 
different product for which another has obtained prior trademark rights, 
either by use or registration. l99 Trademark holders are limited to the 
right to exclude others from the subsequent use of their mark or con-
fusingly similar marks on similar products. They may not extend into 
unrelated areas and enforce their mark.2°O Therefore, trademark holders' 
rights to use their marks are heavily restricted. 
State antidilution statutes provide the best example of this restric-
tion.201 Dilution is a theory said to be originally postulated by Frank 
195. [d. 
196. 15 U.S.C. § 11I5(b)(4) (1988). 
197. Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1980) (use of 
DOMINO'S on pizza did not infringe use of DOMINO on sugar). 
198. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1990) (two users 
of identical PERINI name for identical construction services, summary judgment denied 
because of the different consumers and the level of sophistication of those consumers). 
199. GILSON, supra note 10, § 5.05[5]. 
200. Unless, of course, such extension is expected from the products on which the 
mark was originally used. This is known as "bridging the gap." AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft 
Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). See also GILSON, supra note 10, § 5.05[5]. 
201. Twenty-five states now have anti dilution statutes: 
Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (Supp. 1992) 
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 70-550 (Michie 1992) 
California: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993) 
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STATE. ANN. § 35-lIi(c) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) 
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (Supp. 1992) 
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) 
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 1O-1-451(b) (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1992) 
Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (1977 & Supp. 1992) 
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, para. 22 (Smith-Hurd 1986 & Supp. 1992) 
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.11(2) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) 
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993) 
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Schechter in 1927.202 According to dilution discourse, a trademark's 
distinctive ability to signify one specific source for a product can be 
diminished or "diluted" if other trademark owners use very similar or 
identical marks even on totally unrelated goods. Schechter described the 
problem as the "whittling away" of the distinctive quality of the mark 
and its ability to indicate a single source for a product. 203 
Most dilution statutes can be read very expansively. The New York 
statute, representative of the legal regime of most, states as follows: 
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the 
distinctive quality of a mark or trade name shall be ground for 
injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a mark registered 
or not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwith-
standing the absence of competition between the parties or the 
absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services.204 
That is, the plaintiff should have grounds for an injunction if the 
distinctive quality of its mark is diluted by another regardless of com-
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992) 
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. llOB, § 12 (West 1990) 
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (Vernon 1990 & Supp. 1992) 
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1992) 
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1987) 
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1984) 
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-10 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1992) 
New York: N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368(d) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993) 
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1992) 
Pennsylvania: 54 PA. CONS. STAT. § ll24 (1990) 
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (1991) 
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1988 & Supp. 1991) 
Texas: TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West Supp. 1993) 
Washington: WASH. REV. ANN. § 19.77.160 (West Supp. 1993) 
Most of these statutes are patterned after the Model State Trademark Bill (Uniform State 
Trademark Act § 12 (1967». Note, Trademark Dilution: Its Development, Japan's Ex-
perience, and the New USTA Federal Proposal, 22 GEO. WASH. 1. INT'L L. & ECON. 
417, 425 (1988); see MCCARTHY, supra note 70, § 22:4, for the text of the Model State 
Trademark Bill. The proposed dilution provision of the 1988 Trademark Revision Act 
was not passed into law. Marie V. Driscoll, The "New" 43(a), 79 TRADEMARK REP. 238, 
245-46 (1989); Kim Muller, An Inquiring Look at the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute, 53 
TEX. BAR 1. 718, n.4 (1990). 
202. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis oj Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. 
L. REV. 813 (1927). However, as a general theory, dilution can be traced back to a 
German case involving a mouthwash manufacturer, Judgement of Sept. 11, 1924, Landg-
ericht Elberfeld, 25 luristiche Wochemschrift 502, XXV Markenschutz und Wettbewerb 
(M.U.R.) 264. At the time of this case, both English and American courts were considering 
the concept as well. See Note, supra note 201, at 420-21. 
203. Schechter, supra note 202, at 825. 
204. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368(d) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993). 
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petition between them, regardless of the likelihood that consumers are 
confused, and regardless of whether or not the mark is registered. 
A classic example of dilution theory at work applying the Illinois 
anti-dilution statute is Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc. 205 There the 
defendant used the mark POLARAID on or in connection with the sale 
of its refrigeration and heating systems while the plaintiff had used its 
mark POLAROID on cameras for many years prior to defendant's use. 
Under traditional trademark theory, the plaintiff would not prevail in 
this situation because the products on which the marks are used are so 
different that the relevant consumer would not be confused into thinking 
a camera company was the source of its refrigerating system-that is, 
the products are not competing, and therefore no confusion is likely to 
occur. With no confusion, by definition, trademark infringement could 
not occur. 206 
However, relying solely on the Illinois anti-dilution statute,207 the 
Seventh Circuit granted the injunction, stating that if the anti-dilution 
statute had not been applicable in this situation, "it is useless because 
it adds nothing to the established law on unfair competition .... "208 
Most interestingly, and perhaps to the consternation of the Polaroid 
court,209 generally courts have refused to interpret anti-dilution statutes 
as broadly as the clear meaning of the statute would allow.210 The New 
York courts, for example, require evidence of confusion even though 
the New York statute clearly dictates that dilution may be found regardless 
of confusion.2I1 Oddly enough, the Illinois courts will refuse to find 
dilution if there is confusion because "[a] trademark likely to confuse 
is necessarily a trademark likely to dilute. "212 The existence of these two 
diametrically opposed positions regarding the interpretation of virtually 
identical statutes is irreconcilable. 
In Mead Data Central v. Toyota,213 the Second Circuit dissolved an 
injunction regarding Toyota Moto~ Corporation'S use of the trademark 
205. 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963). 
206. Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 581-82 (2d CiT. 1990). 
207. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, para. 22 (Smith-Hurd 1961); Polaroid Corp., 319 
F.2d at 836. 
208. 319 F.2d at 837. 
209. See also David S. Wei kowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 V AND. L. 
REV. 531 (1991). 
210. Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity 
Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 618, 622 (1976). 
211. Id. at 624 n.47 and references cited therein. 
212. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274-75 n.16 
(7th CiT. 1976). 
213. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d 
Cir. 1989). 
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LEXUS. The plaintiff had been using the trademark LEXIS in connection 
with its computer data retrieval systems since 1972. The Southern District 
of New York granted the injunction and awarded very creative damages 
to Mead Data Central. 214 However, the Second Circuit reversed and 
dissolved the injunction against Toyota.21S In its opinion, the Second 
Circuit limited the anti-dilution statute to "famous" marks.216 The Second 
Circuit did this even though the word "famous" does not appear in 
the New York anti-dilution statute. 217 
This holding, irreconcilable with the statute, is justified only if one 
recognizes that, even in light of the anti-dilution statute, the common 
law places extreme restrictions on the use of a mark by the trademark 
holder. Not to place this restriction on trademark holders would come 
too close to recognizing a trademark itself as property. If one has a 
property right in the mark itself, it would follow that one should be 
able to enjoin use of that mark on completely unrelated goods or services, 
regardless of the existence or non-existence of confusion. On the other 
hand, if no property right exists in the mark itself, then courts should 
only protect one's right to use that mark on exact or confusingly similar 
products. 
The Second Circuit's reasoning in Mead Data reflects the greater 
common law tendency to draw distinctions and boundaries in order to 
avoid outcomes which the clear language of the state anti-dilution statutes 
would otherwise dictate. That is, rather than describing property rights 
in and to a trademark itself, it is conceptually more consistent with the 
evolution of trademark jurisprudence to say that an owner has property 
rights to use the mark on certain products, and not a property right 
in the mark itself. 218 
Carrying Honore's analysis through to its next applicable element, 
trademark holders do not possess a right of transmissibility or alienation 
as other "owners" do. The best example of this is the common law 
214. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 702 F. Supp. 1031, 
1044-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The court allowed Toyota to continue using the mark LEXUS 
on automobiles, but prohibited it from competing with Mead in computer-related fields; 
the court required Toyota to pay the costs incurred by Mead in the effort to inform all 
customers that there is no connection between them; the court required Toyota to disavow 
any relationship to Mead in all future advertising; and finally the court required Toyota 
to compensate Mead yearly for any diminution in the usefulness of Mead's LEXIS mark. 
However, Mead was permitted to use these funds only to supplement its own advertising 
designed to offset the effect of any diminution. 
215. 875 F.2d at 1032. 
216. Id. at 1031. 
217. See also Michael L. Taviss, In Search of a Consistent Trademark Dilution 
Test, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1449 (1990). 
218. Libling, supra note 179 at 104. 
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rule that trademarks are not assignable without the appurtenant goodwill. 
Trademark ownership is assignable but an "assignment in gross" is 
an invalid transfer; unless the owner of a mark transfers the goodwill 
associated with the mark, the assignment transfers nothing. An attempted 
trademark assignment without the appurtenant goodwill is said to be a 
"naked assignment" or an "assignment in gross" and invalid.219 This 
is so because at common law the only sustainable reason to grant legal 
protection of the mark was to protect the goodwill associated with that 
mark.220 
In other words, a trademark "owner" does not even have the 
unrestricted right to alienate its mark apart from the business or trade 
in connection with which the mark is employed.221 A trademark is nothing 
without the related goodwill or business which it has come to represent. 222 
It is use223 of a trademark alone that gives the mark value. 224 
However, just because something has value does not mean that it 
is therefore property. Long ago, Felix Cohen recognized the fallacy 
behind the logic of: X has "created a thing of value; a thing of value 
is property; [X], the creator of the property, is entitled to protection 
against third parties who seek to deprive him of his property.' '225 This 
reap/sow logic as a rational justification for recognizing property in 
intangibles is said "to. have so little reason that response is difficult. "226 
This Lockean labor theory of attempting to justify property interests 
in intellectual property-I spent time and energy on it therefore I own 
219. E. & J. Gallo Winery Corp. v. Gallo Cattle Co., 955 F.2d 1327, 1337 (9th 
Cir. 1992); Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 675-78 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Sands, Taylor & Wood v. The Quaker Oats Co., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1457, 1464-67; GILSON, 
supra note 10, §§ 3.07[11, [61; MCCARTHY, supra note 70, § 18:1. 
220. Steven L. Carter, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 785 (1990). 
But see Vincent N. Palladino, The Real Trouble With Trademarks, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 
150 (1991) (There has never been a clear relationship between trademarks and goodwill; 
Carter's assumption is grossly overstated.). 
221. . American Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1925). 
222. The doctrine of prohibiting assignments in gross, however, has currently evolved 
into mostly formalism. See MCCARTHY, supra note 70, § 18.2 at 800. Courts currently 
reserve use of the doctrine for only the more egregious cases such as when the assignee 
is not in the same business as the assignor, is not in a position to make use of the mark, 
and has no intention of doing so. Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. The Quaker Oats Co., 
1992 U.S. App. Lexis 20674, *27 (7th Cir. 1992); Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 
F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Carter, supra note 220, at 786. 
223. "Use" also includes a bona fide intent to use as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1052 
(1988). 
224. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 95 (1879). 
225. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REv. 809, 815 (1935). 
226. Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning In/ormation: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 178 (1992). 
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it-is now largely discredited.227 In a society such as ours, the reward 
for labor is not and should not always be property. Inventiveness in 
marketing, which is a primary goal of trademark holders, is market 
share and increased sales-not property in the trademark itself (the 
vehicle of that inventiveness).228 An entrenched property interest only 
breeds the opposite of what the goals of intellectual property should 
be-that is, recognizing near absolute property rights in a mark itself 
only would encourage manufacturers to sit on these property rights rather 
than actively compete. 
Therefore, if it were possible to possess a property right in a trade-
mark itself--valuable or not--one should be able to alienate it freely 
without restrictions as onerous as having to sell the very business it has 
come to represent. 229 That such an attempted alienation without the 
appurtenant goodwill is invalid indicates that trademarks cannot satisfy 
Honore's final incident of ownership-transmissibility. 
One commentator has concluded that property rights in descriptive 
marks cannot be justified either on an economic basis or a possessory 
basis.230 The "economic basis" for recognizing property rights is the 
notion that the more scarce a specific thing becomes, the more value 
it has. Unless someone has exclusive control of the thing, it cannot be 
put to its highest-valued use. Therefore, no one will invest the time and 
money to promote it without some assurance of reaping profits from 
its investment. 231 The "possessory basis" as a rationale for recognizing 
property rights is that the first to possess or occupy a thing ought to 
become its exclusive owner. 232 
However, property rights in trademarks themselves, descriptive or 
not, cannot be justified on these basic notions of property either. Trade-
marks, regardless of whether they are descriptive, are not scarce com-
modities. A newcomer selling a particular commodity can get rather 
close to the original trademark so long as it does not become "likely 
to cause confusion." That is, if competitors need a new trademark, all 
227. Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy 
of Property Rights and Idea/ Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 817, 821-35 (1990). 
228. Id. at 834 n.68. 
229. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (trademarks 
are not a right in gross or at large like copyrights or patents, which are little value as 
an analogy when examining trademark law); Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper 
Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 425 (1908) (a patent is clearly a private property right); McLean 
v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877); Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 322 (1871). 
230. Naresh, supra note 8, at 986-90. 
231. Id.; see a/so RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 30-33 (3d ed. 
1986). 
232. Naresh, supra note 8, at 987; LAWRENCE BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILO-
SOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 24-31 (1980). 
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they have to do is create it. Rather than a scarce resource, trademarks 
are unlimited-or more accurately, limited only by the creator's imag-
ination. 
Boudewijn Bouckaert concludes that the twin features of natural 
scarcity and possibility of physical possession-elements that justify prop-
erty rights in oneself and tangible objects-do not justify recognition 
of property rights in any intellectual property.233 Bouckaert argues that 
intellectual property should be called unjustifiable special privileges granted 
by government. 234 
Furthermore, no trademark at common law was protected from 
attack merely because one party "occupied" it first. Prior appropriation 
was the key element at common law, but attacks on a mark's validity 
were never foreclosed. There was no comparable concept to incontest-
ability at common law. If a person adopted and began using a mark, 
that person was never free from attacks on validity, regardless of how 
long he used the mark or whether he chose to register it. 
Although none of the traditional property right concepts support 
the creation of property rights in a trademark itself, this is not to say 
that the right to exclude others from using a trademark is not a property 
right. It very well may be. 235 The difference is that when others are 
excluded from something, such as the use of a piece of land (trespass), 
the excluding party owns the underlying entity as "property." In trade-
mark discourse, after the right to exclude others, there is nothing left 
to own. 
Furthermore, trademarks are clearly different from other forms of 
intellectual property such as copyrights. Copyrights are divisible and 
alienable without any regard to the value or business that may be 
associated with the copyrighted work. 236 Copyrights are also divisible. 
A copyright owner can assign the right to recreate the copyrighted work 
in movie form to one party and assign the right to recreate the work 
on T-shirts, for example, to an entirely distinct party.237 Furthermore, 
233. Boudewijn Bouckaert, What is Property?, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 775 
(1990). 
234. This characterization is derived from Dale A. Nance, Foreword: Owning Ideas, 
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 757, 768 (1990). 
235. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987). 
236. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (1977). 
237. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); 
H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123-124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5738-5739 ("[T)he ownership of copyright, or any part of it, may be transferred by any 
means of conveyance or by operation of law, and is to be treated as personal property 
upon the death of the owner"). 
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copyrights are treated as personal property at the death of the author 
or owner. 238 
Therefore, trademarks are different than other forms of tangible 
property and even intangible property, each of which have their grounding 
in the Constitution.239 Trademarks are intangible property rights which 
grant the holder the right to exclude others from use of a mark on 
certain products. There are no property rights in the mark itself. The 
common law will not grant what would amount to new property rights 
in trademarks themselves. This is why courts do not recognize assignments 
in gross or the clear dictates of state anti-dilution statutes. If courts 
did, the result would be to recognize property rights in the marks 
themselves-something the common law has refused to do for centuries. 24O 
Also, because trademarks cannot satisfy any of the main elements 
of Honore's incidents of ownership, trademarks differ from other tangible 
and intangible things that are subject to ownership. Because trademarks 
themselves are not subject to ownership, strictly speaking, there is no 
"trademark owner" but rather the "owner of the right to exclude others." 
Courts and commentators alike mistakenly refer to this as the "trademark 
owner" without regard to the significance of their error. Given that 
there is no trademark to own, there can be no trademark owner. 
Commentators as well as judges often use property rhetoric to 
describe trademark rights. 241 When discussing trademarks, property rhet-
238. See sources cited supra note 237. 
239. Some feel that this distinction-trademarks evolving from common law while 
patents and copyrights are grounded in the Constitution-adds to their legitimacy. See 
Tom O. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 
12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 264-68 (1989) (patents are an illegitimate state granted monopoly 
that would be legitimate if they had evolved from common law like trademarks). 
240. See Mahaney, supra note 142, at 1154. 
241. See, e.g., 2 RUDOLPH CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS 
(1945): 
But it is still problematic whether the courts will recognize a property right in 
a trade-mark [itself]. This remains so notwithstanding the fact that statutes refer 
to the "owner" of a trade-mark; courts use the term "owner" and "proprietor" 
of a trade-mark; trademarks have been called monopolies, property rights or 
"vested rights of property;" courts frequently adopt such phrases as "trespass 
upon property," "title" to a trade-mark and "chain of title," and have recognized 
that "theoretically and perhaps practically as well this hard-earned right is as 
important as money in the bank." 
Id. § 66.3, at 821-22 (citations omitted). Another quotation is instructive on how loosely 
courts use the property rhetoric without any apparent concern for its significance: 
To prevail on a statutory or common law trademark infringement claim a plaintiff 
must demonstrate an infringement of this limited property right. He must establish 
that the symbols in which this property right is asserted are valid, legally 
protectible trademarks; that they are owned by plaintiff; and that defendant's 
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oric should be dispensed with to the extent possible.242 The use of property 
rhetoric only confuses the valid rights of trademark holders. Ownership 
of a mark itself implies much more than what the common law has 
-been willing to recognize. Therefore, use of the term "ownership" creates 
expectations that the holder should be treated as an "owner" rather 
than merely one who possesses a limited right to exclude others from 
using the mark. If one "owned" a trademark as defined by Honore, 
one should be able to sell the mark without the appurtenant goodwill 
and should be able to enforce the mark even though the alleged infringer's 
products do not compete. The use of property rhetoric causes courts to 
go through great contortions to validate outcomes still using property 
rhetoric. If property rhetoric were not used at all, courts would be at 
liberty to more clearly state the reasoning for specific decisions. Because 
courts are restrained by the property rhetoric, they are confined to use 
reasoning based on property concepts. However, when there is no actual 
property at issue-tangible or otherwise-courts and practitioners struggle 
to make sense out of the outcome. 
The fact that legislators, judges, and commentators feel the need to 
refer to property rhetoric when referring to trademarks further indicates 
the misconception that most hold regarding trademarks. Given that 
trademarks themselves are not subject to ownership because they are 
not property, it follows that any concept or legal regime based on or 
furthering the notion that trademarks themselves are property and subject 
to ownership should be invalid. Such is the case with incontestability. 
The incontestability provisions of the Lanham Act were a blind 
attempt at creating new rights never before recognized by the courts in 
the protection of trademarks. 243 Incontestability attempts to recognize 
property rights in the trademark itself. Today, courts and commentators 
subsequent use of similar marks is likely to create confusion as to origin of 
the goods. 
Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 581·82 (2d Cir. 1990). A "limited property 
right" is, of course, never defined. However, by framing the analysis using this property 
rhetoric, the court is then confined to determine its outcome on whether it satisfies a 
"limited property right." However, because trademarks themselves are not property, the 
analysis is internally illogical. 
242. This is why I prefer to use the term "trademark holder" herein rather than 
"trademark owner." I recognize that "holder" is also, to some extent, property rhetoric 
because it implies physical possession. However, the use of "holder" is an attempt to 
draw a distinction from the genera! notion of owning the underlying entity upon which 
rights are based. 
243. Fletcher, supra note 85 (Incontestability was a faltering first step, moving 
trademark law from mere registration and procedural advantage to granting new substantive 
rights.). 
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alike have generally dismissed the notion that a trademark itself could 
be owned as property. 244 
It is quite significant that in 1947, the year the Lanham Act took 
effect, the well-respected trademark scholar, Dr. Rudolph Callmann,24s 
concluded that the incontestability provisions of the Lanham Act finally 
recognized what no United States court had been willing to accept: the 
trademark itself could be owned outright and trademarks themselves 
were property.246 So sure was he that a trademark itself was now property, 
in commenting on the incontestability provisions of the Lanham Act, 
Callmann concluded as follows: 
Moreover, the new Act gives "this property right a legislative 
standing it had not had before" by declaring trademarks in-
contestable after "continuous use for five consecutive years." 
This development should effectively put to rest all arguments 
advanced by opponents of the property right theory. . .. [I]t 
would seem that Section 15 of the Trade-Mark Act demonstrates 
Congressional willingness to recognize the trade-mark as property 
right.247 
Callmann's article in which he made the above conclusion analyzes 
several cases prior to the Lanham Act that would seem to recognize a 
trademark as property and juxtaposes them against those cases that 
conclude a trademark is not the appropriate subject of property rights. 
Callmann's conclusion is based on cases where courts have found in-
fringement even though the infringing party is not a competitor. This 
makes sense, Callmann argues, only if the trademark is property. In 
enacting the incontestability provisions, Callmann concludes that Congress 
expressly recognized this line of cases by granting trademarks property 
status. 
244. Internnational Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 
919 (9th Cir. 1980); Libling, supra note 179; Fletcher, supra note 17, at 307; Hanover 
Star MiIling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916) ("common law trade-marks, the 
right to their exclusive use, are of course to be classed among property rights"); Person's 
Co., Ltd. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Adams Apple Distrib. Co. 
v. Papeleras Reunidas, 773 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1985); American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 
269 U.S. 372 (1925); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918) 
(there is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to the 
established business or trade in connection with which the mark has been employed); 
Elderkin v. Monn, 80 N.W.2d 331, 334 (Iowa 1957); Fair Undercar Car, Inc. v. Wakefield, 
1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10120 (N.D. III. 1992). 
245. Callmann is also the author of the comprehensive treatise on trademarks, THE 
LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES (1950). 
246. Rudolph Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition?: The Importance 
of the Property Concept in the Law of Trade-Marks, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 443 (1947). 
247. Id. at 467. 
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It is not difficult to imagine how Callmann could have been so 
confident that a trademark was now property. After all, the clear language 
of section 33(b) seems to indicate that the mark is subject to absolute 
ownership. Section 33(b) states that an incontestable mark "shall be 
conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the 
registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and 
of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark .... "248 If Congress 
did not intend to recognize "ownership of the mark" itself as something 
distinct from the holder's exclusive right to use the mark, it should not 
have listed each of these separate elements. Under the common law, 
only the element of exclusive use was ever recognized and that was never 
"conclusive. " 
That is, section 33(b) refers to the registrant's exclusive right to use 
the mark in commerce on specified goods as if this were something 
different from ownership of the mark. However, as argued above, since 
there is no actual "ownership" of the mark itself, it is completely unclear 
to what Congress referred when mentioning the "conclusive" evidence 
of the registrant's ownership of the mark. Courts have recognized only 
a limited right in a trademark to exclude others from using the mark 
on similar goods. By separating ownership of the mark (something not 
recognized at common law) from the exclusive right to use the mark 
(something recognized at common law), Congress raised the implication 
that there was an entity which could be absolutely owned-the mark 
itself. It is difficult to imagine that after twenty-six years249 of studying 
the matter, Congress and Representative Lanham were not aware of this 
distinction.250 
Callmann's theory of trademarks as property has been ignored by 
the courts. Since 1947 (the date Callmann's article was published), only 
one court in the United States cited Callmann's article, and it did so 
as supporting a contrary view to the proposition that the persuasive 
function of a trademark alone is generally not protected by courts.2S1 
248. 15 U .S.C. § 11l5(b) (1988) (emphasis added). 
249. The Lanham Act is said to be the culmination of twenty-six years of effort 
by Congress, business, and the bar to reform the old Trademark Act of 1905. See 
Comment, Incontestable Trademark Rights and Equitable Defenses in Infringement Lit-
igation, 66 MINN. L. REV. 1067, 1067 n.2 (1982). 
250. Representative Lanham must have been aware of this problem from the prior 
Act of 1870 which was struck down by the Supreme Court for granting trademark holders 
greater rights than allowed under the Constitution. Perhaps, in reality, Representative 
Lanham devised a way around the problem. In one sense, he gave a trademark essentially 
property status but did not call it property. Rather, he called it incontestable. 
251. 88 Cents Stores, Inc. v. Martinez, 361 P .2d 809, 818 (Or. 1961). Callmann's 
article has been cited five times in major law reviews in the United States; however, only 
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Completely contrary to Callmann's perspective, rather than promoting 
and accepting trademarks as property, courts have even become more 
hostile to the notion since 1947. In fact, there is not a single case 
subsequent to the passage of the Lanham Act where a United States 
federal court concludes that a trademark is property and can be owned 
outright regardless of products on which the mark is used. 
This does not mean that Callmann was totally wrong. In fact, 
Callmann at least had the foresight to read the plain meaning of the 
statute and give his well-reasoned opinion. The incontestability provisions, 
as worded, recognize a right more powerful and more significant than 
that previously recognized by courts prior to the passage of the Lanham 
Act. There are no conclusive presumptions of validity or registrant's 
ownership of the mark in the common law prior to the Lanham Act. 
There is no "ownership" of a mark separate from the "exclusive right 
to use" the mark at common law. Any reference to "ownership" can 
only be ownership of the right to exclude others, not of a right to 
possess and monopolize the mark itself. 
Therefore, courts, too, are correct in concluding that there are no 
property rights in trademarks themselves. The trademark right depends 
upon use on products and only precludes others from using the same 
or similar mark on the same or similar products. Courts since the 
enactment of the Lanham Act unanimously agree with this proposition. 
Callmann was correct in saying that incontestability on its face grants 
property rights in the mark itself. However, courts have also been correct 
in stating that the common law has never recognized property rights in 
the mark itself. In light of the additional fact that Congress, in order 
to survive constitutional scrutiny, intended only to codify the common 
law of trademarks and not create new rights,m it is only natural that 
once was Callmann's piece cited for the proposition that trademarks are property. See 
Kenneth York, Extension of Restitutional Remedies in the Tort Field. 4 UCLA L. REV. 
499. 513, 533 (1957). All other cites to Callmann's piece are references to why anti-
dilution statutes are required to deal with confusion where there is no competition. See 
Thomas Deering. Trade-Marks on Noncompetitive Products. 36 OR. L. REV. I, 4 (1956); 
Walter J. Derenberg. The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes. 
44 CAL. L. REV. 439, 450 (1956); Pattishall. supra note 210, at 621; Welkowitz, supra 
note 209, at 534. Callmann is, of course, one of the leading proponents of a federal 
dilution statute and has been cited innumerable times for his stand on dilution. For a 
representative article by Callmann on his dilution position, see Rudolph Callmann, Trade-
mark Infringement and Unfair Competition. 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (1949). The 
other leading proponent is Beverly Pattishall. See Pattishall, supra note 210. 
252. As was shown previously, the legislative history of the Lanham Act is replete 
with references regarding the rights granted by the new statute. All references clearly state 
that no new substantive rights were intended to be created by the Lanham Act and that 
the Act is merely a registration statute. The purpose of the Lanham Act was to codify 
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courts are confused in how best to apply incontestability. If courts were 
to apply the incontestability provisions as written, they would intuitively 
realize that they would be recognizing trademarks as property. This, of 
course, would be diametrically opposed to the common law of trademarks 
for hundreds of years. Even though Callmann was correct in concluding 
that Congress intended to recognize property rights in a trademark itself, 
courts will not be agreeing with him anytime soon. Even in light of the 
Supreme Court's directive in Park 'N Fly that some courts have inter-
preted to be a directive to begin giving an incontestable mark its full 
effect,253 courts have found judicially crafted ways to avoid recognizing 
a mark as property without ever saying so. 
This is the primary source254 of inconsistency and unpredictability 
. the existing common law of trademarks and provide one, nation-wide uniform system of 
trademark registration and protection. The Committee on Patents and Trademarks, when 
debating the Lanham Act, concluded that "[t]he purpose of [the Lanham Act] is to place 
all matters relating to trade-marks in one statute and to eliminate judicial obscurity .... " 
S. REp. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. I (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. 1274. See 
also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 
522, 531 (1987) (citing Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985), 
for the importance of a system of national trademark protection). The Committee also 
indicated the Lanham Act should "remedy constructions of the present acts which have 
in several instances obscured and perverted their original purpose. These constructions 
have become so ingrained that the only way to change them is by legislation." S. REP. 
No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.S. at 1276. This· 
language, offered by the Senate 46 years ago in support of the Lanham Act, is an 
appropriate call today for amendment of the judicially obscured concept of incontestability. 
Similarly, courts have concluded that the Lanham Act is meant to be a registration 
statute. However, there is a line of older British cases that seem to equate trademarks 
with property. See, e.g., Edelsten v. Edelsten, 1 De G.1. & S. 185 10 (N.S.) 780 (1863); 
Hall v. Barrows, 4 De G.J. & S. 150, 32 L.J.Ch. 548 (1863); Leather Cloth Co. v. 
American Leather Coloty Co., 4 De G.J. & S. 137 (1863); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Loog, 8 
App. Cas. 15 (1882). For an analysis of these cases and their relationship to the issue 
of trademarks as property, see Callmann, supra note 246, at 454-55. The statute did not, 
most courts argue, create nor intend to create any new substantive rights for the trademark 
registrant. 
253. Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1988). 
254. Other sources of the inconsistent application of incontestability in general and 
§ 33(b) include the claim that the incontestability provisions of the Lanham Act are poorly 
drafted. See Christensen, supra note 33, at 1196, 1207 (if Congress had only made its 
intentions clear through the language of the Act itself, courts would not be so confused 
in the application of incontestability). However, if statutory interpretation was the only 
issue at hand, it is unlikely that there would be such a divergence of opinion among the 
federal courts regarding how to apply incontestability. There are more than a few poorly 
drafted statutes that courts have had to apply. Simple ambiguity in the statute is not a 
reason why virtually every federal court in the United States reinvents the incontestability 
wheel each time they are called upon to apply it. Rather, when confronted with ambiguous 
or poorly drafted statutes, there are limited ways in which courts are expected to proceed. 
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among the circuits.m The clear language of the statute would imply a 
property right, but the legislative history and subsequent court opinions 
clearly preclude such a conclusion. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The concept of incontestability was anew, substantive addition to 
the law of trademarks. Trademark discourse would be greatly enhanced 
if that fact were openly recognized. This addition to the Lanham Act, 
although today well-used by trademark practitioners, has been a constant 
source of confusion to the courts. This has led to inconsistency among 
the courts to an astonishing degree.2'6 This confusion stems from the 
The court first looks to the plain meaning of the statute. If the plain meaning of the 
statute does not answer the question as to how the statute should be applied, courts are 
to look to the legislative history for that particular provision. But c.f, Frank Easterbrook, 
What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 441 (1990) (courts should 
not concern themselves with the intent of the legislature because it is not their intent that 
matters but rather what the statute itself actually means). If that is somehow inadequate, 
courts are then expected to look to how courts first in their jurisdiction and then in other 
jurisdictions have applied the same or similar provisions. However, on its face, § 33(b) 
is not ambiguous. Section 33(b) clearly states that an incontestable registration shall be 
conclusive evidence of the mark's validity and that the registrant owns the mark. Congress 
could not be more clear in drafting this portion of the Lanham Act. The directive to 
courts is to make an incontestable mark conclusive evidence of the validity and ownership 
of the mark. There is no ambiguity here. The inconsistencies between the federal courts 
cannot be easily explained and dismissed by simply arguing the statute is ambiguous. 
Another factor at play is the fact that new rights were created by the Lanham Act, 
as was recognized by the Supreme Court in Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, 
Inc., 469 U.S. 189 (1985); this may explain why the courts have been so confused. That 
is, for forty years prior to Park 'N Fly, the legislative history instructed courts that there 
were no new rights created by the Lanham Act; other precedent concluded that there 
were no new rights created by the enactment of the Lanham Act. However, in reality 
the Lanham Act did create "new rights" in the incontestability provisions and the Supreme 
Court has now recognized this. 
255. This inconsistency should be kept in context. Substantial clarification was 
required at least two other times first by a Supreme Court ruling and then an act of 
Congress amending § 33(b). As was stated above, the Supreme Court in Park 'N Fly 
clarified that § 33(b) may be used in an offensive manner to enjoin an infringer and that 
an incontestable mark may not be challenged on the ground that the mark is merely 
descriptive. In 1988, Congress further clarified § 33(b) so that courts would no longer 
be confused regarding whether or not equitable defenses could still be used by a defendant 
when the plaintiff's mark was incontestable. 
Few statutes in the history of the United States have required the express attention 
of the Supreme Court ruling and Congress to clarify its application and still remain 
ambiguous, confusing, and inconsistently applied by the courts. As this Article has shown 
up to this point, § 33(b) is still applied in completely unpredictable ways by the various 
federal courts. Clearly, § 33(b) of the Lanham Act has been and remains one of the 
greatest sources of controversy in Trademark law. 
256. See Appendix A, infra notes 257-389 and accompanying text. 
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fact that incontestability is a departure from the common law of trade-
marks. As such, incontestability has not been given its full import by 
the courts. This is because to do so would be to recognize trademarks 
themselves as property-something the common law has declined to do 
for centuries. Because the statutory language of incontestability grants 
trademark holders property in marks themselves, and because incon-
testability itself is a departure from common law,.it should be abolished. 
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FEDERAL COURT HOLDINGS REGARDING STRENGTH 
OF THE MARK SINCE 1985257 
CIRCUIT Expressly does Ignores incontesta- Considers incon- Expressly holds 
not consider bility relative to testability an incontestability 
incontestability strength element of creates strength 
relative to strength 
strength 
First D. Puerto Ricol D. Rhode Islandl 
D. Mass.lCIR- D. New Hamp-
CUlT shire/D. Mass. 
Second S.D.N.Y S.D.N. Y .lCIR- S.D.N.Y.lD. D. Conn. 
CUlT Conn. 
Third D.NJ. CIRCUIT E.D. Pa. 
Fourth M.D.N.C. D.S.C. W.D. Va. 
Fifth CIRCUIT IS.D. S.D. Tex. 
Tex. 
Sixth CIRCUIT IE.D. S.D. Ohio CIRCUIT IE.D. 
Mich. Mich. 
Seventh CIRCUIT N.D.III. 
Eighth D. Minn. D. Minn.lD. 
Neb/W.D. Mo. 
Ninth CIRCUIT IC.D. CIRCUIT/D. 
Cal. Ariz. 
Tenth CIRCUIT 
Eleventh N.D. Ga.lS.D. S.D. Fla.lM.D. CIRCUIT 
Fla. Fla. 
Federal CIRCUIT 
D.C. (no cases) (no cases) (no cases) (no cases) 
257. The year 1985 was chosen because that was the year of the Park 'N Fly 
decision. 469 U.S. 189. Although there were many incontestability cases prior to 1985, 
and some dealt with strength of the mark analysis, those are not addressed here because 
to do so would be completely redundant. Observing the past seven years of trademark 
opinions is more than adequate to establish that courts currently appear to be devoid of 
direction when adjudicating incontestability cases. Furthermore, there was the expectation 
that Park 'N Fly and the subsequent 1988 amendments would clarify incontestability. The 
fact that these attempts failed is made even more obvious by the table above. 
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1. First Circuit 
The district courts within the First Circuit are confused and incon-
sistent in their analysis of whether an incontestable mark contributes to 
the mark's strength. Older cases seem to indicate it does not; newer 
cases seem to indicate it does;2S8 some cases ignore it.259 
In Edison Brothers v. National Development Group, Inc.,260 the 
District Court of Massachusetts determined that incontestability "con-
tributes to a mark's strength."261 The court cited Boston Athletics As-
sociation v. Sullivan262 as support for this proposition. Although the 
court in Boston Athletics does list three criteria to be used in determining 
the strength of the mark,263 it is not a case regarding incontestability. 
Given that the plaintiff's mark in Boston Athletics was not registered 
until 1985, it is statutorily impossible for it to have become incontestable 
by trial in 1987. Therefore, the Edison Brothers court's reliance on 
Boston Athletics is confusing at best. This simply reinforces the notion 
that courts are confused about the application and impact of incon-
testability. That is, when a district court addressing an incontestable 
mark relies on a circuit court's opinion where an incontestable mark 
was not at issue, it seems to indicate the ignorance of the lower court 
regarding the effect of incontestability. 
Another case addressing strength of an incontestable mark is Decosta 
v. Viacom International, Inc. 264 In Decosta, the District Court of Rhode 
Island stated that incontestability is an element to be considered when 
measuring the mark's strength.265 As support for this, the court relied 
upon the Eleventh Circuit266 and the Sixth Circuit. 267 The only reference 
to a First Circuit case was Keds Corp. v. Renee International Trading 
258. Alexis Lichine and Cie v. Sacha A. Lichine Estate Slections, Ltd., 229 U.S.P.Q. 
294, 296 (D. Mass. 1985). 
259. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 819 
(1st Cir. 1987); Davidoff Extension S.A. v. Davidoff Comercio E Industria Ltda., 747 
F. Supp. 122, 131 (D. Puerto Rico 1990). 
260. 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2839 (D. Mass. 1992). 
261. [d. at *12-*13. The District Court of New Hampshire would apparently agree 
with this statement. See Kappa Sigma Fraternity v. Kappa Sigma Gamma Fraternity, 654 
F. Supp. 1095, 1I01 (D.N.H. 1987) (incontestability is a factor of strength along with 
national use ,and length of use). 
262. 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989). 
263. The three criteria are: length of time the mark has been used and the plaintiff's 
popularity in field; strength of the mark in the plaintiff's field of business; and, the 
plaintiffs actions in promoting the mark. [d. at 32. 
264. 758 F. Supp. 807 (D.R.1. 1991), rev'd, 981 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1992). 
265. 758 F. Supp. at 814. 
266. Dieter v. B & H. Indus. of Southwest Fla., 880 F .2d 322, 329 (11th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 369 (1990). 
267. Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1I83 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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Corp.268 However, the court in Keds only raises incontestability to con-
clude that an incontestable mark is presumed to have secondary meaning. 269 
Although this is generally accurate,270 the court in Decosta clearly pred-
icated that an incontestable mark is presumed to have secondary meaning 
and a mark with secondary meaning is presumed to be strong. 
The First Circuit, however, reversed.271 The First Circuit held that 
registering a trademark does not expand the substantive protections of 
that mark.272 It refused to make any connection between the registration 
of a mark and its strength. The court ignored the incontestable status 
of the mark implying that any registered mark would be just as "strong" 
as any other. Although the court admitted that "'strength' relates to 
confusion and registration 'relates' (in this way) to strength," the court 
limited this analysis to validity of a trademark registration and not to 
the burden of proof in showing a likelihood of confusion.273 In fact, it 
expressly stated that trademark registration only confirms for a reviewing 
court that a claimed mark is, in fact, a trademark. 274 
2. Second Circuit 
The district courts within the Second Circuit are completely incon-
sistent in their treatment of incontestable trademarks. Some courts have 
held that an incontestable mark is not precluded from attacks on its 
strength merely because it has become incontestable. 275 Some recent 
opinions imply that the status of the mark should be, or at least will 
be, ignored in determining its strength. 276 In stark contrast to these 
268. 888 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1989). 
269. [d. at 220-21. 
270. MCCARTHY, supra note 70, § 32:44(8). 
271. DeCosta v. Viacom, 981 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1992). 
272. [d. at 612-13. 
273. [d. at 616. The court expressly stated that it agrees with the Seventh Circuit's 
analysis of the effect of registration-it confers no substantive and limited procedural 
advantages. It is not clear from the opinion whether the First Circuit would now follow 
the Seventh Circuit's opinion regarding incontestability. Except for mentioning the fact 
that the mark was, indeed, incontestable, the court never again mentions that matter. 
Rather, it discusses the "registration" of the mark and ignores the "incontestability" of 
the registration. For that reason, I have categorized the First Circuit as "ignores" in-
contestability rather than "expressly does not consider" as the Seventh Circuit does. 
274. [d. 
275. Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96, 121 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Marjorica S.A. v. Majorca Int'l, Ltd., 687 F. Supp. 92, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988). 
276. W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 1992 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 7609 at 
·26-·28 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Merriam-Webster Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1755, at 1757 n.5, 1757-1758 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that while the mark COLLEGIATE 
mayor may not be incontestable, based on a failure to republish a 1905 Act registration, 
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holdings, the District Court of Connecticut used incontestability (along 
with fame and registration) to conclude that the mark A-I had "enormous 
strength. "277 
Some courts have held that incontestability is a prominent factor in 
determining the strength of a trademark. For example, in Marshak v. 
Sheppard,278 the court found that incontestability contributed to the 
strength of the plaintiff's mark, THE DRIFTERS.279 In Frito-Lay, Inc. 
v. The Bachman Co. ,280 the court held that the plaintiff's mark RUFFLES 
was incontestable, and that incontestability was an element of the mark's 
strength. 281 
In the Eastern District of New York, the matter was left ambiguous 
in Transamerica Corp. v. Trans American Abstract Service, Inc. 282 The 
court considered the strength of plaintiff's incontestable mark TRANS-
AMERICA by first looking at the mark's distinctiveness. 283 The court 
concluded that incontestability has a positive impact on determining a 
mark's distinctiveness but did not clarify whether incontestability also 
impacts strength.284 Although ambiguous, the court does not appear to 
equate strength with distinctiveness.285 
In the District Court of Connecticut, an incontestable mark is a 
presumptively strong mark. In Haydon Switch & Instrument, Inc. v. 
Rexnord Inc., 286 the court expressed the opinion that incontestability 
makes a mark presumptively strong.287 The court cited Park <N Fly for 
the proposition that once a mark has become incontestable, it may not 
be challenged on the grounds that it is merely descriptive and that the 
mark is therefore "strong. "288 The court equates distinctiveness with 
strength and interpreted Park 'N Fly's holding (that an incontestable 
mark could not be attacked on the grounds of mere descriptiveness) as 
incontestability is irrelevant for the purposes of this case, presumably because the court 
found the combination mark WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE to possess secondary meaning); 
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 631 F. Supp 735, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985), afl'd, 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986) (lower court concludes that incontestability is 
an element of strength, but the circuit court does not mention it in its strength analysis). 
277. Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. Arnold Kaye and Arnie's Deli, Ltd., 760 F. Supp. 
25, 27 (D. Conn. 1991). 
278. 666 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
279. [d. at 601. 
280. 704 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
281. [d. at 435. 
282. 698 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
283. [d. at J072. 
284. [d. 
285. [d. 
286. 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1510 (D. Conn. 1987). 
287. [d. at ISIS. 
288. [d. 
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meaning that incontestability contributes to the strength of the mark.289 
3. Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit's treatment of incontestability is particularly trou-
bling. 290 First, the District Court of New Jersey held that although Park 
W Fly abolished any offensive/defensive distinction in reliance on an 
incontestable trademark, the Supreme Court had not gone so far as to 
allow a private right of action to be based solely on § 33(b).291 Although 
ultimately reversed by the Third Circuit,292 this holding by the District 
Court of New Jersey highlights the difficulties courts have had in applying 
incontestability doctrine. That is, in Park W Fly, the Supreme Court 
precisely allowed for private causes of action based on incontestable 
trademarks. That a court would attempt to cling to the old distinction 
even in light of the Supreme Court mandate simply identifies the great 
conceptual problem courts have with incontestability. 
Even more disturbing is Spirol International Corp. v. Vogelsang 
Corp.293 In an incredibly brief opinion, the court raises, dismisses, and 
then ignores the plaintiff's claim that its mark had become incontestable. 
Although in a cryptic footnote the court indicates that there may have 
been some suggestion at trial that the mark in question was obtained 
fraudulently,294 the court totally ignores any incontestability analysis even 
though the court "assumes arguendo"m that the mark was, in fact, 
incontestable. 
289. Id. 
290. Courts within the Third Circuit cannot even decide if strength of the mark is 
an element in their test for likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., American Olean Tile Co. 
v. American Marazzi Tile, Inc., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1145, 1148 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (strength is 
an element); Apollo Distrib. Co. v. Jerry Kurtz Carpet Co., 696 F. Supp 140, 142 (D. 
N.J. 1988) (strength is an element; incontestability and length of use make a strong mark); 
Schering Corp. v. Schering Aktiengesellschaft & Berker Labs., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 175, 
186-87 (D. N.J. 1987) (no clear statement on whether strength is element); Nippondenso 
Co., Ltd. v. Denso Distribs., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3782 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (strength is 
not an element of likelihood of confusion analysis); Pedi-Care, Inc. v. Pedi-A-Care Nursing, 
Inc., 656 F. Supp. 449, 454-55 (D. N.J. 1987) (strength is not an element to likelihood 
of confusion test); Byrnes & Keifer Co. v. Flavoripe Co., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124, 1127 (W.D. 
Pa. 1986) (strength is not an element of likelihood of confusion test); Tree Tavern Products, 
Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 1263, 1269-70 (D. Del. 1986) (strength is an element 
of the likelihood of confusion test, but incontestability not considered in strength analysis); 
Trump v. Caesar's World, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1015, 1021-22 (D. N.J. 1986), aff'd without 
opinion, 819 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1987) (strength is not an element of likelihood of confusion 
test). 
291. Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 704 (D.N.J. 1985), 
rev'd, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989). 
292. Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 673 (3d Cir. 1989). 
293. 652 F. Supp. 160 (D. N.J. 1986). 
294. Id. at 162 n.1. 
295. Id. at 162. 
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In another case out of the District Court of New Jersey, the court 
held that "[s]ection 33(b) of the Lanham Act allows a trademark owner 
to assert the sole right to use only its exact mark. "296 This interpretation 
puts a new restriction on the offensive use of section 33(b) that is not 
found anywhere in the Lanham Act or the Park 'N Fly opinion .. The 
court in American Cyanamid Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., cited 
Wei! Ceramics & Glass Inc. v. Dash to support the notion that section 
33(b) only applies to an exact copy of a mark.297 However, this reliance 
is misplaced. The language the court in American Cyanamid relied on 
in Wei! Ceramics addresses the differences between an infringement action 
and a challenge to a mark's validity. In that sense, only the exact mark 
may be valid; however, it does not limit a registrant to asserting the 
sole use of only its exact mark. Unless an incontestable mark is given 
the same protection as any mark in an infringement setting-that is, 
infringed if the defendant's mark is likely to cause confusion regardless 
of whether the marks in question are exact-all purpose of section 33(b) 
is lost. 
The court in American Cyanamid also stated that even an incon-
testable mark may be deemed weak.298 This approach seems to be the 
general trend in courts in the Third Circuit which dismiss incontestability 
from the strength analysis.299 This is opposed to recent cases from the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania that have held that incontestability clearly 
contributes to a mark's strength.3°O 
4. Fourth Circuit 
Courts in the Fourth Circuit are no less confused than those in the 
Third Circuit regarding the application of incontestability and Park 'N 
Fly. In Convenient Food Mart v. 6-Twelve Convenient Mart,30) one court 
went so far as to say that if a defendant counterclaims and attacks the 
validity of an incontestable mark, the plaintiff will be accorded the 
296. American Cyanamid Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1018, 
1024 (D.N.J. 1989) (emphasis added). 
297. American Cyanamid, 729 F. Supp. at 1024 (citing Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. 
v. Dash, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1013 (3d Cir. 1989». 
298. 729 F. Supp. at 1024. 
299. Institute for Scientific Information, Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, 
Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1010 (3d Cir. 1991) (court refuses to find "mere descriptiveness" 
to avoid implications of Park 'N Fly but rather finds "clear descriptiveness"~a new 
concept nowhere else used in trademark law-to allow defendant to avail itself of fair 
use defense); Country Floors, Inc. v. Country Tiles, 930 F.2d 1056, 1063-64 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
300. Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1094, 
1099 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
301. 690 F. Supp. 1457 (D. Md. 1988), aff'd, 870 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1989). 
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prima facie presumption and not the conclusive presumption302 that the 
mark is valid. The court in Convenient Food Mart even cited Park W 
Fly for this proposition. In doing so the court completely misread Park 
W Fly. The Supreme Court in Park W Fly stated that a successful 
assertion of a section 33(b) defense shifts the presumption of validity 
from conclusive to prima facie. The Supreme Court did not say that a 
defendant need only raise a section 33(b) challenge, but rather that it 
must be "established. "303 
Regarding the use of an incontestable mark as a strong mark, the 
courts within the Fourth Circuit are quite divided. The District of South 
Carolina held in May of 1990 that incontestability can be considered in 
determining the strength of a mark. 304 In order to support this proposition 
the district court had to look elsewhere for precedent. It turned to Dieter 
from the Eleventh Circuit. 30S Coupled with the fact that the court found 
the mark suggestive, the court concluded that an incontestable mark was 
strong.306 
However, just months later, the Middle District of North Carolina 
determined that incontestability has no bearing on a mark's strength. 
In Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,307 the 
court looked to cases from the Fifth308 and Seventh309 Circuits to support 
its conclusion. All of these cases ignored the earlier case of Frances 
Denney, Inc. 310 in which the District Court of West Virginia held that 
incontestability automatically gave the holder superior rights over the 
alleged infringer. 
Therefore, if a plaintiff is suing in federal court in South Carolina, 
the plaintiff may expect an incontestable mark to play a role in the 
determination of the mark's strength. If that same plaintiff sues in North 
Carolina, just across the border, incontestability may have no bearing 
on determining the strength of that mark. Meanwhile, if that same 
302. 690 F. Supp. at 1460 (citing Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 
469 U.S. 189, 199 n.6 (1985). 
303. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 199 n.6 (1985). 
304. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Sand Dollar Car Rentals, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 
876, 879 (D.S.C. 1990). 
305. Dieter v. B. & H. Indus. of Southwest Fla., 880 F.2d 322 (11th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 928 (1990). 
306. Dol/ar Rent A Car Sys .• Inc., 765 F. Supp. at 879-80. 
307. 748 F. Supp. 344 (M.D. N.C. 1990), a/I'd, 964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1992). 
308. Oreck Corp v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc. 803 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
481 U.S. 1069 (1987). 
309. Munters Corp. v. Matsui Am., Inc. 730 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. III. 1989), a/I'd, 
909 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 591 (1990). 
310. Frances Denney, Inc. v. New Process Co., 670 F. Supp. 661, 666 (W.O. Va. 
1985). 
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plaintiff ~ues in West Virginia, the plaintiff may expect incontestability 
to weigh heavily in its favor. 
5. Fifth Circuit 
The Fifth Circuit has recently begun to establish itself as a leader 
in trademark cases.3I1 Let us hope that this circuit's confusion regarding 
incontestability will not be followed blindly by others. The courts of 
the Fifth Circuit have variously held that Park 'N Fly applies only to 
validity and not to an infringement setting,312 that incontestability is 
conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark,313 
and that an incontestable mark is deemed to be "totally incontestable."314 
First, the Supreme Court made it very clear that the entire purpose 
of granting certiorari in Park 'N Fly was to dispel the notion that the 
Lanham Act drew any distinction between the use of an incontestable 
mark to defend its validity or to enforce it offensively.3U The Fifth 
Circuit's conclusion in Oreck Corporation, therefore, is totally at odds 
with Park 'N Fly, and was ignored by the Southern District of Texas 
in Service Merchandise. 316 
Park 'N Fly was also completely ignored by the Fifth Circuit in 
Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe International Inc.317 In that 
case, the court found the mark PIG SANDWICH was descriptive and 
311. This happened when the Supreme Court followed the Fifth Circuit's minority 
position and held that inherently distinctive trade dress does not have to be shown to 
possess secondary meaning before it is enforceable against infringers. Taco Cabana v. 
Two Pesos, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2756 (1992). Other prominent circuits are now quickly 
following. See, e.g., Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 825-26 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). For the argument that Taco Cabana was wrongly decided, see David Q. 
Burgess, Comment, Taco Cabana Missed the Point: Trade Dress Can Never Be Inherently 
Distinctive (Apr. IS, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Burgess argues 
that unlike trademarks, trade dress can never be inherently distinctive. Therefore, he argues, 
courts should always require secondary meaning. Id. 
312. Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987): 
Park 'N Fly merely held . . . that an infringement action brought by the holder 
of an incontestable mark may not be defended on the ground that the mark 
is merely descriptive and therefore invalid. [citation omitted]. u.S. Floor's ar-
gument was not that Oreck's mark was invalid, but that it was not infringed 
because there was no confusion. Park 'N Fly says nothing to preclude this 
argument. Incontestable status does not make a weak mark strong. 
313. Joy Mfg. Co. v. C.G.M. Valve & Gauge Co., 730 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (S.D. 
Tex. 1989). 
314. Service Merchandise Co. v. Service Jewelry Stores, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 983, 
999 (S.D. Tex. 1990). 
315. Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 193, 203-205. 
316. 737 F. Supp. 983. 
317. 951 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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needed secondary meaning to be valid,318 even though it clearly recognized 
that the mark had become incontestable.319 The court then proceeded 
to examine the mark for secondary meaning and concluded that the 
jury's finding of secondary meaning was not unfoundedYo 
In 1990, the Southern District of Texas held in Service Merchandise 
that incontestability deems a mark to have secondary meaning. 321 This 
conclusion apparently was not supported by the Fifth Circuit for it 
ignored Service Merchandise in its secondary meaning/incontestability 
analysis in Texas Pig Stands, Inc. 322 Finally, of interest in Service Mer-
chandise, the court allowed the incontestability of one of the plaintiff's 
three marks to be used to establish secondary meaning for all three 
marks in question. 323 Clearly, the Southern District of Texas gives much 
more weight to an incontestable mark than the Fifth Circuit. 
6. Sixth Circuit 
In the Sixth Circuit, one case in particular stands out. In Wynn Oil 
Co. v. Thomas,324 the court stated that: 
Permitting [defendant] to relitigate the original strength or weak-
ness of the mark runs afoul of Park 'N Fly's requirement that 
courts give full effect to incontestable trademarks. Therefore, 
while the strength of plaintiff's mark will still be at issue in 
cases involving contestable marks, once a mark is registered for 
five years, the mark must be considered strong and worthy of 
full protection.m 
The court does not cite where in Park 'N Fly the Supreme Court 
states that a defendant cannot challenge the strength of an incontestable 
mark. Rather, the Supreme Court in Park 'N Fly, rightly or wrongly, 
seems to have declined the opportunity to settle that issue; for the Sixth 
Circuit to claim that it had is judicial fantasy.326 If Park 'N Fly had 
318. [d. at 692-93. 
319. [d. at 689-90. 
320. [d. at 693. 
321. Service Merchandise Co. v. Service Jewelry Stores, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 983, 
999 (S.D. Tex. 1990). 
322. The Western District of Texas also ignored incontestability relative to its strength 
analysis. American Auto. Ass'n v. AAA Ins. Agency, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 787, 792 (W.O. 
Tex. 1985). 
323. Service Merchandise Co., 737 F. Supp. at 999. 
324. 839 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1988). 
325. [d. at 1187 .. 
326. This has not stopped the Sixth Circuit from making the same conclusion 
elsewhere with no supporting authority. See, e.g., Wynn Oil Co. v. American Way Servo 
Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 600 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Gougeon Bros., Inc. v. Hendricks, 
708 F. Supp. 811, 815 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (implying that if plaintiff's mark had been 
incontestable the court would have been obliged to assume its strength). 
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only been this clear and direct, perhaps some of the resultant confusion 
among the federal courts could have been avoided. 
There are also district courts within the Sixth Circuit that have held 
that incontestability should only be one of the factors used when analyzing 
the strength of a trademark. For example, in Great American Insurance 
Co. v. GRE America Corp.,m the Southern District of Ohio considered 
many factors in conducting an analysis of the strength of the plaintiff's 
trademark. Among these factors was the fact that the mark was in-
contestable. However, the court relied on the plaintiff's extensive use 
and diligent enforcement of its rights to find the plaintiff's mark strong 
and infringed. 328 
Finally, there are three cases in Ohio where the courts virtually 
ignored the fact that plaintiff's mark has attained incontestability in 
making their analysis of its strength. In Oskiera v. Chrysler Motor 
Corp.,329 although the plaintiff's mark had become incontestable, the 
court ignored that fact and relied on the mark's secondary meaning. 330 
In Little Caesar Enterprises v. Pizza Caesar, Inc., 331 the court considered 
the strength of the plaintiff's trademark without any reference to the 
fact that it had become incontestable.332 Finally, in Crain Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Fairchild Publications, Inc. ,333 the court made mention 
of the mark's incontestability, but then the court did not apply the 
incontestable st~tus to the analysis of the mark's strength. Rather, the 
court relied on the plaintiff's continuous use and survey evidence to 
conclude that the trademark was strong. 334 The court in Crain Com-
munications does, in fact, cite to Wynn Oil,m the case that held that 
an incontestable mark is, by definition, a strong mark. However, the 
court in Crain Communications cited Wynn Oil only for the factors to 
consider in determining likelihood of confusion, but ignored what it said 
about incontestability. 336 
The cases in the Sixth Circuit are completely irreconcilable. Even 
holdings within the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals are inconsistent. 
327. 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17011 (S.D. Ohio 1990). 
328. [d. at *9-*11. 
329. 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1471 (6th Cir. 1991). 
330. [d. at 1473. 
331. 834 F.2d 568 (6th CiT. 1987). 
332. [d. at 571. 
333. 12 U .S.P.Q.2d 1214 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
334. [d. at 1215. Although the court recognizes the mark's incontestability and notes 
that this gives the plaintiff the exclusive right to use it, the court does not then draw 
the connection to strength. Instead, it decides the testimony and exhibits relating to 
publication, circulation, and survey results make the mark strong. [d. at 1215-17. 
335. [d. at 1215 (citing Wynn Oil, 839 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1988), the case that 
held that an incontestable mark by definition is a strong mark). 
336. 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1215. 
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These inconsistent cases are within only a few years of one another. In 
fact, Wynn Oil and Oskiera have a judge in common, even though that 
judge did not write either opinion. 337 
7. Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit has consistently interpreted Park W Fly to mean 
that incontestability is relevant only in analysis of the validity of a 
trademark and plays no role in whether a mark is strong. The Seventh 
Circuit interprets section 33(b) as applying to the validity of a mark 
only, and not to the analysis of likelihood of confusion. More specifically, 
the court in Munters Corp. v. Matsui America, Inc.,338 held that the 
fact that plaintiff's mark had become incontestable was only relevant 
to establishing that it had a valid and existing trademark. The court 
stated that incontestability should play no role in determining whether 
a mark has been infringed. 
In Chicagoland Jobsource,339 the Northern District of Illinois stated 
that "validity and likelihood of confusion are distinct issues ... , and 
an incontestability finding in no way concludes the confusion question; 
incontestability does not mean strength. "340 Furthermore, the Northern 
District of Illinois held in Source Telecomputing,34 I that "the conclusive 
presumption that the marks have secondary meaning established by the 
statutory incontestability of plaintiff's ... marks does not automatically 
transfer into a conclusive presumption of strength in a likelihood of 
confusion analysis." 342 
The Seventh Circuit's analysis relies on a distinction it has drawn 
between validity and infringement when applying incontestability doc-
trines. This is done because the statute expressly says that section 33(b) 
is subject to proof of infringement. However, nowhere in Park W Fly, 
nor anywhere in the statute, does it say that such a distinction between 
validity and infringement should be made when applying incontestability. 
If a mark is granted a conclusive presumption of secondary meaning 
and is, therefore, not merely descriptive for validity purposes,343 it does 
not follow then to say the same mark is merely descriptive and, therefore, 
337. John W. Peck, Senior Circuit Judge. 
338. 909 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 591 (1990). 
339. Source Servo Corp. V. Chicagoland Jobsource, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1523, 1532-
33 (N.D. III. 1986). 
340. Id. at 1532-33. 
341. Source Servo Corp. v. Source Telecornputing Corp., 635 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. 
III. 1986). 
342. Id. at 610. See also Master Protection Corp. v. Firernaster Co., Inc., 1990 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15352, *5-*7 (N.D. III. 1990) (holding that incontestability sheds no 
light on likelihood of confusion). 
343. Park 'N Fly. Inc. V. Dollar Park & Fly. Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 201-03 (1985). 
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very weak for infringement purposes. If this was the intent of the Supreme 
Court in Park 'N Fly, it seems that the Court would have clearly stated 
that incontestability has absolutely no role in infringement analysis. 344 
Rather, this distinction appears to be how the Seventh Circuit avoids 
another possible problem that the Supreme Court left open in Park 'N 
Fly-that is, if a merely descriptive mark is mistakenly registered by the 
Patent and Trademark Office, it should not at any point be enforceable 
against a third party simply because the registrant filed a Section 15 
Affidavit and the mark attained incontestable status. 
This problem could be resolved easily, however, by allowing courts 
to correct the Principle Register pursuant to the Lanham Act. Marks 
that should not have been registered in the first place would thereby 
be barred from enforcement against third party "infringers" and trade-
marks would be given their full meaning-the alleged intention of Park 
'N Fly.34S 
At least one district court within the Seventh Circuit apparently has 
refused to accept the Seventh Circuit's stand on incontestability. In Nike, 
Inc. v. "lust Did It" Enterprises,346 the court concluded that incon-
testability is evidence of a mark's strength347 and cited Wynn Oil v. 
Thomas for that proposition. 348 It is amazing that the Northern District 
of Illinois felt compelled to look to a contrary circuit court case for 
guidance on this issue when their own Seventh Circuit has clearly held 
that incontestability has no bearing on a mark's strength for infringement 
purposes. 
8. Eighth Circui(349 
The Eighth Circuit considers incontestability irrelevant to a mark's 
strength. In Woodroast Systems,3S0 the court stated that "the court notes 
... that the incontestability of a mark does not affect its strength. "3SI 
344. In fact, any language that does exist in Park 'N Fly is to the contrary. For 
example: "[w)e conclude that the holder of a registered mark may rely on incontestability 
to enjoin infringement .... " [d. at 205. 
345. See Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1988). 
346. 799 F. Supp. 894, 897 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 
347. [d. 
348. [d. (citing Wynn Oil, 839 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1988». 
349. As of the date of this writing, the Eighth Circuit has not cited Park 'N Fly 
for any substantive reason that bears mentioning. 
350. Woodroast Sys., Inc. v. Restaurants Unlimited, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 906 (D. 
Minn. 1992) 
351. [d. at 912 n.lO. Curiously, the court in Woodroast cites General Mills, Inc. 
v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 1987) to support this proposition. However, 
the Eighth Circuit in General Mills only held that registration does not affect a plaintiff's 
ultimate burden of proof in showing likelihood of confusion. It is an illogical extension 
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The District Court of Minnesota even appears to consider incontestability 
irrelevant to the issue of validity. In Murrin v. Midco Communications, 
Inc.,3S2 the court stated that although the mark was incontestable, it did 
not mention this fact when concluding that the plaintiff's mark was 
valid. m 
9. Ninth Circuit 
As the circuit where the controversy of Park 'N Fly arose, one 
would expect courts in the Ninth Circuit to follow the Supreme Court's 
opinion Park 'N Fly closely. 3S4 However, the Ninth Circuit actually began 
a new divergence of opinions regarding incontestability that was only 
later settled by the 1988 Amendment to Lanham Act. 
In Jaycees, the Eighth Circuit stated that Park 'N Fly precluded 
equitable defenses because they were not mentioned specifically in section 
33(b).3SS The Ninth Circuit, however, stated that Park 'N Fly allows 
equitable defenses to an incontestable mark.3'6 These two points of view 
are diametrically opposed to one another. 
The Ninth Circuit excludes incontestability from the analysis of a 
mark's strength. For example, in E. & J. Gallo Winery V,. Gallo Cattle 
Co., m the court found the plaintiff's mark strong because it had acquired 
secondary meaning, not because the mark was incontestable. 3S8 Most 
to conclude then that none of the benefits of registration should be considered in the 
likelihood of confusion analysis. The Eighth Circuit in Woodroasl also cites American 
Cyanamid Co. v. S.C. Johnson, Inc. 729 F. Supp. 1018, 1024 (D. N.J. 1989) as controlling. 
352. 726 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Minn. 1989). 
353. /d. at 1200. See also Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 634 F. 
Supp. 990, 992-98 (W.O. Mo. 1986) (although a mark is incontestable, that fact does not 
affect court's analysis of strength); Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Citibank, N.A., 633 F. Supp. 
231, 234-35 (D. Neb. 1986) (although incontestable, court looks to third party licenses to 
find mark suggestive and therefore strong and ignores incontestable status). 
354. In fact, on remand, the Ninth Circuit issued an extremely cursory opinion, 
only mentioning the Supreme Court's opinion overruling it for the narrow holding before 
it, and ignoring all else that was said. 782 F.2d 1508, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986) (on remand). 
355. U.S. Jaycees v. Cedar Rapids Jaycees, 794 F.2d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1986). 
356. pyrodyne Corp. v. Pyrotronics Corp., 847 F.2d 1398, 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1988), 
cerl. denied, 488 U.S. 968 (1988). 
357. 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1657, 1659 (E.D. Cal. 1989) (finding the marks GALLO in-
contestable), modified and off'd, 955 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1992), amended, 1992 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 14119 (9th Cir. 1992). 
358. E. & J. Gallo, 955 F.2d at 1338-1339. There are numerous other examples in 
the Ninth Circuit where courts appear to ignore the fact that the plaintiff's mark has 
become incontestable. See, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Magee, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1530, 1534 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (court relies on precedent from other circuits to find plaintiff's 
mark strong); First Interstate Bancorp v. Stenquist, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159, 1162 (N.D. Cal. 
1990) (court found plaintiff's mark strong relying on nine years of use, fame in the 
banking industry, and advertising expenditures). 
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recently, the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed this position stating that 
incontestability has nothing to do with the strength of a mark. 3S9 
The case in the Ninth Circuit most often cited for the proposition 
that an incontestable mark has no relevance to the strength of the mark 
appears to be Miss World Ltd. v. Mrs. America Pageants, Inc.3f7J How-
ever, such reliance appears to be misplaced. The court in Miss World 
Ltd. analyzed strength as follows: First, the court examined the mark's 
distinctiveness in terms of the continuum from generic to· arbitrary and 
determined that incontestability made the mark at least inore than generic. 
Second, the court investigated the strength of the mark in the marketplace. 
This "strength in the marketplace" must be something other than sec-
ondary meaning because the court admits that an incontestable mark is 
presumed to have secondary meaning. 361 The court does in fact look to 
incontestability to establish the significance of the mark. The confusion 
arises when the court concluded that "incontestable status does not alone 
establish a strong mark."362 The Ninth Circuit has relied on this language 
to conclude that incontestability should play no role in determining a 
mark's strength.363 This much is clear: the court in Miss World Ltd. 
did not preclude the use of incontestability in determining a mark's 
strength-only that it alone does not establish strength. Relying on this 
case to conclude that courts are precluded from relying on a mark's 
incontestability when determining its strength is a misstatement of lan-
guage in Miss World Ltd. 364 
10. Tenth Circuit 
The District Court of New Mexico has stated that a trademark is 
"incontestable (Le. valid) if either it was registered for more than five 
years before the counterclaim was filed, . . . or it has acquired a sec-
ondary meaning. "365 This is a complete misstatement of the law for a 
359. Visa Int'l Servo Ass'n v. Eastern Fin. Fed. Credit Union, 1992 U.S. App. 
Lexis 14965 (9th Cir. 1992) (not appropriate for publication; citation limited by court 
rules). 
360. 856 F.2d 1445, 1449 (9th Cir. 1988). 
361. [d. at 1448 n.4. 
362. [d. at 1449 (emphasis added). 
363. See, e.g., Visa Int'l Servo Ass'n v. Eastern Fin. Fed. Credit Union, 1992 U.S. 
App. Lexis 14965, at *3·*4 (9th Cir. 1992) (not appropriate for publication; citation 
limited by court rules). 
364. See a/so, Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v Bic Pen Corp., 796 F.2d 254, 257 (9th Cir. 
1990) (plaintiff's mark incontestable but weak nonetheless); National Yellow Pages Serv. 
Ass'n v. O'Conner Agency, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516, 1519 (C.O. Cal. 1988) (registration and 
incontestability in and of themselves do not establish a strong mark). 
365. Foremost Corp. of Am. v. Burdge, 638 F. Supp. 496, 499 (D. N.M. 1986) 
(emphasis added). 
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variety of reasons. This may be the best example of a court's total 
confusion over Park 'N Fly and incontestability in general. 
First, incontestability is not automatic. 366 Incontestability is acquired 
only if the registrant chooses to file a Section 15 Affidavit with the 
Patent and Trademark Office. 367 That is, a mark conceivably could be 
registered for a lot longer than five years and still not be incontestable 
if the registrant has not filed a Section 15 Affidavit claiming incon-
testability. Park 'N Fly nowhere states that incontestability is automatic 
after five years of registration. 
Also, a mark may have more than adequate secondary meaning 
pursuant to § 1052(f),368 and still not be incontestable. The District Court 
equated secondary meaning with incontestability. This is completely wrong. 
Although an incontestable mark is presumed to have secondary mean-
ing,369 a mark with secondary meaning is not presumed to be incon-
testable. Often an applicant obtains a registration of a descriptive mark 
because the applicant shows the mark has secondary meaning. This 
secondary meaning may exist prior to the date of the application. This 
would occur when a trademark holder fails to register the mark for 
years and then finally files after many years of customer recognition 
has been built up. The District Court's reliance on § 1052(f) for the 
apparent proposition that a mark with secondary meaning is, pursuant 
to § 1052(f), automatically incontestable is unsustainable in light of the 
clear language of the statute. 
The Tenth Circuit does not consider strength an element of the 
likelihood of confusion analysis. 370 In Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club 
Foods Co., 371 the Tenth Circuit stated that incontestability can be used 
text. 
366. But see supra note 102. 
367. 15 U .S.C. § 1065(3) (1988). See also supra notes 104-13 and accompanying 
368. Section 2(0 states: 
Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs [(a)-(d») of this section, nothing in 
this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which 
has become distinctive of the applicant's good in commerce. The Commissioner 
may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become distinctive, as 
used on or in connection with the applicant's goods in commerce, proof of 
substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the applicant 
in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness 
is made. 
15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1988). Nowhere in this section does the statute equate secondary 
meaning with incontestability. 
369. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 203 (1985). 
370. Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., 935 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 
1991). 
371. 805 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986). 
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for two purposes: to show validity372 and to show secondary meaning. 373 
As stated previously, it is inconsistent to say that incontestability may 
not be used to analyze the strength of a mark and, simultaneously, say 
it may be used to presume secondary meaning. This is because a mark 
with secondary meaning has at least enough strength to be recognized 
by the relevant public. According to the definition of strength-the 
tendency of the mark to identify the goods sold under the mark as 
emanating from a particular source374-secondary meaning and strength 
are almost synonymous. Therefore, the court's reasoning in Beer Nuts 
is circular and does not clarify the application of incontestability. 
11. Eleventh Circuit 
Today, the Eleventh Circuit consistently holds that an incontestable 
mark is a strong mark. In Dieter v. B. & H. Industries of Southwest 
F1orida,m the court stated that the "incontestable status is a factor to 
be taken into consideration in the likelihood of confusion analysis. 
Because Dieter's mark was incontestable, then it is presumed to be at 
least descriptive with secondary meaning, and therefore a relatively strong 
mark."376 
Before Dieter, some courts in the Eleventh Circuit used incontest-
ability in their strength of the mark analysis377 and some did not. 378 
Today, courts within the Eleventh Circuit are apparently following the 
Dieter court. In Burger King Corp. v. Hal/,379 the court held that the 
strength of the mark should be determined by incontestability, registra-
372. See also Universal.Money Centers. Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 17 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1435, 1438 (D. Kan. 1990). 
373. Beer Nuts, 805 F.2d at 924. See also Universal Motor Oils Co., Inc. v. Amoco 
Oil Co., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1613, 1618 (D. Kan. 1990). 
374. McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979). 
375. 880 F.2d 322 (11th Cir. 1989). cert. denied, 495 U.S. 928 (1990). Analysis of 
Eleventh Circuit cases is particularly difficult because courts in this circuit typically use 
the words "strength" and "type of mark" interchangeably. See, e.g., Ocean Bio-Chem, 
Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1546, 1554 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Gold 
Kist, Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1291, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Clayton v. Howard 
Johnson Franchise Sys., Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1553, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1988); Rolex Watch 
U.S.A. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 488 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
376. Dieter. 880 F.2d at 329. 
377. Clayton, 730 F. Supp. at 1559. 
378. Gold Kist, Inc., 708 F. Supp. at 1297 (court looks to distinctiveness and third 
party usage of the same or similar mark and consumer recognition of the mark to find 
a strong trademark); Rolex Watch U.S.A., 645 F. Supp. at 488 (court looks to arbitrariness 
of the mark to find strong mark); Bell Lab., Inc. y. Colonial Prod., Inc., 644 F. Supp. 
542, 545-46 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (court looks to distinctiveness and third party use to determine 
if mark is strong). 
379. 770 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Fla. 1990). 
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tion, whether the mark is arbitrary, suggestive or descriptive, and public 
recognition. 
One Florida court's confusion over incontestability is astounding and 
therefore bears mention. In Chase Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. 
Chase Manhattan Financial Services, Inc., 380 the court found the defen-
dant's mark incontestable,381 but the court also found that the mark did 
not have secondary meaning.382 In fact, the court decided "[n]either 
Plaintiff nor Defendant(s) has acquired as against the other the exclusive 
right to the name 'Chase' through common usage sufficient to obtain 
ownership of a secondary meaning in the name or mark 'Chase."'383 
The court resolved the situation by giving each party certain concurrent 
rights to the mark. 384 
As we have seen, after Park 'N Fly, no other court would go so 
far as to conclude an incontestable registration is invalid because it is 
merely descriptive.38' The court in Chase Federal either totally misun-
derstood Park 'N Fly, or chose to ignore its clear directive: incontestable 
marks are now not supposed to be challengeable on grounds of being 
merely descriptive. 386 
12. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (FCCA) 
The FCCA has not directly concluded whether it considers incon-
testability a dispositive point when determining a mark's strength. 387 This 
may, in part, be due to the fact that "strength of the mark" is not 
expressly enumerated in the FCCA's test for likelihood of confusion. 
In fact, the cases are so varied on this issue, it is difficult even to 
speculate on whether a clear rule exists in the FCCA. 
Nevertheless,. it appears that the FCCA will not be bothered with 
incontestability when (or if) it considers a mark's strength or for any 
other reason. For example, in G.H. Mumm & Cie v. Desnoes & Geddes, 
380. 681 F. Supp. 771 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 
381. Id. at 773. 
382. Id. at 785. 
383. Id. 
384. Id. at 788. 
385. Any mark that is a mark and lacks secondary meaning is, by definition, merely 
descriptive and invalid. 
386. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 196-197 (1985). 
387. The FCCA has not had much opportunity to do so. There are only five cases 
since Park 'N Fly (1985) where the FCCA addresses incontestable marks. Kenner Parker 
Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1992); National Cable 
Tel. Ass'n, Inc. v. American Cinema Editions, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991); 
G.H. Mumm & Cie v. Desnoes & Geddes, Ltd., 917 F.2d 1292, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1990); 
Imperial Tobacco, Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1575 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1990); 
In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
HeinOnline -- 26 Ind. L. Rev. 587 1992-1993
1993] TRADEMARK INCONTESTABILITY 587 
Ltd.,388 the court stated that the mark was incontestable but made no 
mention of that fact when it discussed the mark's fame. 389 Conversely, 
when the court did address the mark's strength in G.B. Mumm & Cie, 
it totally ignored incontestability. 
388. 917 F.2d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
389. According to the FCCA, "fame" refers to sales, advertising and length of use 
of the mark. [d. at 1295. All of these would be factors contributing to the strength of 
the mark in most other circuits. 
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